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Introduct ion
Aristotle has no doubt that 'change' is the most characteristic mark among the 
natural phenomena that we can observe about us. As against the scepticism derived 
from Humean extreme empiricism, Aristotle believes that knowledge is still possible 
since we who are furnished with reason can observe these phenomena of change, 
such as day coming after night, a seed becoming a plant, a child becoming an adult, 
and the like. In effect, the question why or how these phenomena occur always 
interests us and it might be natural human desire to ask questions as to such events 
themselves and to endeavour to explicate the course of change from the beginning 
to the end. Although Aristotle was not the first philosopher who was interested in 
the phenomena he deserves to be called the first in the sense that he was the first to 
attempt to analyse and explain them systematically. In one of Aristotle's main 
writings, the Physics which is regarded as dealing with the science of nature, he 
concentrates in particular on analysing such phenomena and other related problems. 
At first sight, the notion of change which we come to have seems unproblematic 
since, as stated, there are numerous phenomena which we can take as examples to 
explain it. However, when we take one step further to enquire into the phenomena 
we soon find that it is not so simple a notion. Except for the fact that there are such 
phenomena which can be called change, no question with reference to the notion 
can be easily answered; for instance, how can we have the notion of change? or 
where does change begin? or how can there be change? or the like.
Let us take as an example the question of why we do not always think that a thing 
that exists at one time ceases to exist and a new thing comes into existence at a 
different time, but think that it is the same subject as it was at another time? For 
example, when cold wax becomes hot we say the wax continues to exist, though, as 
Descartes pointed out, everything given to the senses differs. Why? The answer to
2the question might be that we have a certain capacity to intuit the continuity 
thorough change, to identify pertinently a thing at one time as the same thing at 
another time despite its changed appearance. Evans suggests that it presupposes a 
certain mechanism of change.
If you are looking at this book one moment and a moment later see a plate of currv where the book 
was, we would describe this as a case in which a book was replaced by curry but not one in which 
a book changed into curry,... if we have no idea what sort of mechanism this could be, we will not 
accept that there is any thing which has changed ...1
Evans's answer is that we are, at least, capable of knowing that a book cannot 
change into curry. Of course, he would not suggest that we are able to understand 
the mechanism of all change in nature. On the other hand, Aristotle's answer to the 
question is, according to Martin, that "there is a subject and two termini of 
change."2 It is plain that there must be a subject which persists throughout the 
change as well as the human capability to recognise it. That is, if there were 
nothing that persists throughout change we would not be entitled to claim that this 
thing here at the moment is the same as the thing there at another time.
Aristotle says that change is from 'something' to 'something else', or 'something 
different' (Phy. 189b33-34) and presupposes a persistent subject (190al6). This 
statement suggests that there are two types of change: That is, 'from something to 
something else' designates substantial change, 'coming-to-be' and 'passing-away' and 
'from something to something different' non-substantial change, alteration.3 As for 
the former type of change there seems to be no clear subject that persists the 
change, e.g. a tadpole's becoming a frog. On the other hand, as for the latter there 
is clearly a subject in the change; that is, a man is a subject in the example o f his
1 J.D.G. Evans, Aristotle (Sussex: The Harvest Press, New York: ST. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 15.
2 C. Martin, The Philosophy o f  St. Thomas Aquinas (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 59.
3 B.A. Brody, Identity and Essence (Princeton & New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 
pp. 71-73.
3losing an arm. With reference to these types of changes, Aristotle therefore 
suggests in the Physics in 1.1 that a natural process of our questions related to the 
notion of change should not stop at the place where we can experience certain 
things, i.e. knowing that a book cannot change into curry, or that there are two 
termini of change, or the immediate subject which persists throughout non- 
substantial change, but goes further to enquire into the area where there are 
unobservable conditions, i.e. what is the mechanism, or what are the sources of 
change, or what is the subject which persists throughout substantial change.
Aristotle's basic assumptions concerning change in the Physics are obviously based 
on his belief in our ordinary experience but it should be noted that they are indeed 
taken for granted in order to search for more general sources of change, such as 
potentiality, nature, and the like. These assumptions are in effect the beginning of 
our inquiry and therefore, it is reasonable, I believe, for Aristotle to claim that such 
an inquiry should start from sensory observations which we, humans, generally have 
in common. As pertinently emphasised, for Aristotle our senses or experiences 
need not be examined for the time being, although they might be examined later on. 
That is, to question how it is possible for us to experience so and so, for example, is 
a later step.
The aim of this research is to come to a deeper understanding of Aristotle's theory 
of change based on our ordinary experience by finding out what are the 
preconditions and the real sources of change of beings in his philosophy. To 
understand this we will have to deal with much of Aristotle's philosophy. For, as 
stated, change is not only related to observable phenomena but to diverse principles, 
such as privation, potentiality, nature, and essence. However, this research 
primarily focus on the Physics Books I and II. For in these two books Aristotle 
endeavours to answer the questions following the process of change from the 
beginning to the end, such as how change is possible, what is the beginning of 
change, what is the source of change, what is the change of beings for, and the like.
4In chapter I, I will begin our discussion by examining Aristotle's initial claim that 
there is change in nature and his objection to the Presocratics concerning the 
problem of the number of the first principles and whether what is comes into 
existence from what is or from what is not. Unless these problems are properly 
answered Aristotle is not entitled to claim that there is change in nature.
Chapter II presents Aristotle's conception of the genesis of beings and of change. 
Aristotle conceives that a pair of contraries is the first principle which is the 
beginning of many beings. In considering Aristotle's objection to the number of the 
Presocratics' principles, we are required to examine how he understands theirs, and 
what are his own principles. And in order to understand the questions at issue we 
should indeed enquire into what is Aristotle's analysis of change.
Given the possibility of change, chapter III will be focused on what the changeable 
substances are and what is it that is capable of changing. For Aristotle, it is not the 
case that everything is capable of changing. Beings which are in a state o f privation 
and which possess the potentiality of being acted on corresponding to a potentiality 
of acting are capable of changing. In examining the problem of change the notion 
of potentiality is a crucial principle involved in changeable beings, for change is, 
according to Aristotle, the actualisation of what is potential as potential (201al0- 
18). At this stage Aristotle's other work Metaphysics will be the main source of our 
discussion.
Chapter IV is about the question whether whatever changes changes by itself or by 
something else. Nature, says Aristotle, is a source of movement or rest which is 
present within a thing itself (192b24-25). If we are to comprehend Aristotle's 
theory of change we must see what are the characteristics of nature as well as of 
potentiality.
Finally, in chapter V, I will focus on what Aristotle means by 'for the sake of 
something', which is a final stage of his analysis of change, and whether or how 
Aristotle is successful in defending his teleology against the objection that it seems 
to entail treating all the movements of natural beings as planned. In this work, I will
5on the whole endeavour to answer the questions raised in the course of Aristotle's 
reasoning from the beginning to the end of change. However, where there is not 
enough space to deal with a question or when it is not directly related to the 
question at issue I will have to leave it unanswered.
6C hapter I
Aristotle’s Criticisms of the Presocratic Principles
Aristotle's disagreement with his forerunners' theories about the first principle, 
which is generally defined as a beginning, out of which many things come, mainly 
rests on two points: (1) that none of them properly cope with the number of first 
principles and (2) that they draw wrong conclusions from wrong assumptions.
... for example, the arguments of both Melissus and Parmenides, which conclude wrongly from 
false premises: or rather especially the argument of Melissus. which from a single absurdity simph 
deduces the rest with no grace or effort. (Phy. 185a9-12: 186a 7-10)
For this reason, Aristotle in the first book of the Physics devotes himself to 
analysing and examining their assumptions. It is therefore worth examining why 
and in what sense he thinks his predecessors' assumptions are wrong and how' he 
can settle their difficulties. Firstly, therefore I will show what Aristotle's 
assumptions are, although this thesis is very common and well known, since it is the 
grounds for his assertions w'hich are dealt with in this dissertation; then I will 
examine whether Aristotle's objection to the Presocratic assumptions is sound.
I will then proceed to analyse the problem of what is coming from what is or what 
is not. Aristotle's handling of this problem in the Physics 1.8 is mainly focused on 
defining the two terms, what is and what is not. For the early philosophers' 
misunderstanding the problem of becoming is, Aristotle thinks, because they fail to 
distinguish the meanings of each term. That is, what is has two contexts, 'coming 
from what is' and 'what is, acts and is acted upon' (191b3-6), and what is not means 
'in so far as it is-not' (b8-10).
7Since these three theses are, I think, Aristotle's basic grounds for his claim that 
'there is change in nature' I will concentrate on expounding his position and finding 
some problems which might occur against it.
1.1 Aristotle's Grounds for Assumptions
Let us begin with asking where Aristotle's inquiries start from. Throughout the 
history of Western Philosophy, numerous questions, concerning the nature of the 
universe, of man, and the like, have been raised and many philosophers have never 
ceased to make their effort to give proper answers to them. As Aristotle states in 
the Metaphysics, it is true that we cannot expect that all questions can be answered.
... evidently they were pursuing science in order to know... the possession of it might be justly 
regarded as beyond human power: for in many ways human nature is in bondage, so that 
according to Simonides 'God alone can have this privilege'... (Met. 982b 21-32)
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that in searching for an answer to questions most of 
the questions are based on a certain number of assumptions which are temporarily 
not to be questioned. In effect, an assumption is the beginning of questions, for 
since we are not able to ask and solve every matter which we confront at every 
moment it is required for us to have a starting point of our enquiries.
What is then Aristotle's starting point? A detailed explanation concerning his 
emphasis on our experience can be found in the Physics 1.1. He says,
... in exploring nature... There is a natural path for us to follow. It leads from what is familiar or 
erident to us to what is by nature clear or conclusive. The reason for this is that what is 
intelligible relatively to ourselves and what is inherently intelligible are not the same. Hence it is 
also necessary for us to conduct our investigation in this manner. We must start with what is
naturally obscure, though apparent to us: and wc must advance to what is naturally manifest and 
determinate. (184a 16-22)
At first sight, it seems obvious that the distinction between what is obscure and 
what is apparent to us is according to our observation. However, it should be noted 
that Aristotle's suggestion is not only restricted to our observation, or our sense 
perception. Of course, when we observe natural phenomena happening around us it 
is apparent to us that there is change in nature. For example, Socrates' nose which 
was pale becomes red, day comes after night, and so on; we can take numerous 
examples to prove the fact that there is change. However, with sense perception we 
are able to know that, for example, there is fire in front of us or there is something 
hot. But. it is not possible for us to grasp with sense perception alone the 
connection between fire and being hot, i.e. fire is that whose essence is to be hot. 
This connection is what Aristotle means by 'what is obscure to us'.
As it will be shown throughout this work, what Aristotle wishes to suggest is that 
if we do experience such and such a thing we should take it for granted. In brief, 
Aristotle would say that, as he does in explaining nature in the Physics II I, it would 
be unnecessary to try to prove what is apparent to us (193a 4-5). Given the fact 
that there is change in nature, the next step for us to take is, as Aristotle suggests, 
to enquire into the rest of questions such as how an assumption based on our senses 
can go further into a question that we cannot reach immediately with the senses.
1.2 Aristotle's Objection to the Presocratic Assumptions
"There must be first principles." This is a basic assumption which natural 
philosophers have successively maintained since the beginning of philosophy. 
Thales, who first pays close attention to natural phenomena, notices the fact of 
ceaseless change which is the most characteristic mark of nature; spring and
9summer, birth and death, a child becoming an adult, and the like. They are obvious 
examples of coming-into-being and passing-away which we can observe through 
our senses. It is therefore natural that Thales asks the question what the beginning 
of them is or what the primary or ultimate nature of the world is. Since Thales, 
philosophers have considered the original or primary stuff or things as one or many. 
How many principles are there? In order to answer the question, Aristotle presents 
a long refutation of the Presocratics on the ground that their attempts are not at all 
successful for they are based on a wrong assumption.
Some of them think that being is a single principle, while others think there is a 
plurality of principles. And some of them even think that there is no change at all. 
.Aristotle refuses all these assertions. Aristotle's condemnation of his predecessors 
is based on his assumption that being is not a unity (Phy. 1.2) and that there is 
change. "We, on the other hand," says .Aristotle, "must regard it as basic that all or 
at least some natural beings are changeful, as is evident from induction ( 185a 12- 
14)." His grounds for the assumption that there is change are, counter to 
Parmenides who denies the senses as illusory, derived from his observation of the 
natural phenomena which we can immediately observe through our sense- 
perception. As we have seen in the previous section, his suggestion is that we 
should regard our experience as a starting point.
Aristotle in the Physics 1.2 divides the Presocratics into two groups in accordance 
with their assertions on the number of first principles. Although it is true, as 
Bostock says, that "he often seems much more interested in the question of how 
many principles there are than in the question of what they are,"4 the number of the 
principles is in effect not so significant to him. More important points for him are 
the fact that there is change in nature and the need to explain such change. 
However, since this is the stage where we examine how Aristotle is able to establish 
his own assumptions against the Presocratics we will briefly see his objection to
4 D. Bostock, 'Aristotle on the Principles of Change', in M. Schofield and M.C. Nussbaum (eds.). 
Language and Logos, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982), p. 181.
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them concerning the number of the first principles. Aristotle maintains that the first 
principle is neither one nor a plurality.
If there is a single principle, it is either independent of movement as Parmenides and Melissus 
allege, or subject to movement as natural philosophers say; some of the latter identify the first 
principle with air. whereas others identify it with water. If there is a plurality of principles, they 
are either limited or unlimited in number: if they are numerically limited but more than one. there 
are two, three, four, or some other definite number of them; it they are numerically infinite, they 
are either, as Democritus describes them, homogeneous, though different in shape or in kind, or 
even contraries. (Phv. 184b 14-22)
Among those who maintain there is only one single principle, Thales sought for the 
original stuff of numerous things and considered water as the fundamental and 
primary thing. A general account of the reason why he thought of water as the 
beginning is said to be due to his observation of the process of water being solid, 
when it is frozen, and of being vaporous, when it is heated. Anaximenes, on the 
other hand, presents air as the principle of man's life since he witnessed the fact that 
man is able to live as long as he breathes. From this point of view, he concluded 
that "the primary substance bears the same relation to the life of the world as to that 
of man."5 He introduces the notion of condensation and rarefaction in order to 
explain the difficulty of how it is possible that all things come from one primitive 
element. For Parmenides, Being or reality is 'the One' which is complete, and so it 
neither requires any change or movement nor has contraries in it. And therefore he 
dismisses the multitude of sensible things as mere illusion. For him what is is 
always present and will ceaselessly be in the future.
Aristotle rejects as absurd the Presocratics' assertions that there is no change and 
that being is a unity. "To consider whether being is a unity and is independent of
5 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London: Adam and Charles Black. 1908). p. 79.
] ]
movement." says Aristotle, "is to turn one's eyes away from nature (Phy. 184b29- 
30)." He explains that being is not a unity for, if there is nothing but unity, then 
there is no longer any principle, since a principle is a principle of some fact or facts 
(185a3-5). and that there cannot be any difference between a principle and a fact or 
facts. What he maintains throughout the Physics is that there must be some 
distinction between one thing and another, otherwise, there cannot be different 
things in nature as opposed to our observation. Similarly, if there is only one 
principle then there is no distinction between the principle and a fact, and therefore 
the principle is the fact itself and vice versa. If they are the same, then we need not 
enquire into what a principle is. If a fact is a beginning of itself it cannot be called a 
principle for a principle designates a beginning of 'many beings'. The passage 
requires us to examine Aristotle's conception of the first principle that is defined as 
the beginning or origin of many beings.
... principles are not to be derived from one another or front anvthing else, but they are themselves 
the beginnings of everything... {Phy. 188a 27-28)
We might well assume that, for .Aristotle, it is meaningless to name as the first 
principle a principle which is not differentiated from a fact or facts. In other words, 
if there were a single principle it is vacuous to claim that a principle is an origin of 
itself. Nevertheless, some presocratic philosophers made an error claiming that 
there is only one principle and at the same time trying to seek the origin. Therefore, 
he concludes that the number of the first principles is not one.
In objecting to his predecessors' assertions, Aristotle probably has in mind his 
notion of categories of which ten are listed in his work, the Categories. In the fifth 
chapter of the short work, he differentiates the primary substance, e.g. the 
individual man, from the secondary' substance, e.g. the species 'man'. The former is 
neither predicated of a subject nor present in a subject, whereas the latter is 
predicable of a subject but not present in a subject. On the other hand, the other
12
categories, such as quality, quantity, relation, and so on, are predicated of a subject 
and present in a subject. In addition, they admit variation of degree, whereas there 
is no varying degrees in substance.
Armed with the theory of the categories, he goes on to argue that the meaning of 
'to be' is not single but various. He asks in what sense all things are declared to be 
one. If all things are one primary being which has quantities and qualities, whether 
or not they are separated from one another, beings are not one but many {Phy. 
185a 27-29). For if things have different quantities or qualities, then they are 
different from one another in shape, in place, in kind, or in size. Besides, there 
cannot be anything which has quantities or qualities apart from a primary being. 
Presumably, Aristotle wants to point out again that quantity and quality which are 
predicated of something else is different from a subject which does not belong to 
something else. Therefore, he objects to Parmenides's and Melissus's reasoning that 
'to be' has only one meaning {Phy. 185a8-12).
Aristotle goes on to expound in what sense the Presocratics assert that things are 
one .
To be ’’one" means to be (1) continuous or (2) indivisible or (3) one and the same in a definition 
stating "what-it-meant-to-be-something" (for example, \-ine-culture and wine-growing). But (1) if 
things are "one’' in the sense of being continuous, their "one" is "many" inasmuch as anything 
continuous is infinitely dmsible. ... Do part and whole constitute a unit} or a [duality or ] 
plurality, and in what sense? ... Then (2) if things are "one" in the sense of being indivisible, there 
will be no quantity or quality ... And (3) if all things are one in definition (like "clothes" and 
"garment")... then the same thing may be both good and not good or, for that matter, both a man 
and a horse. (185b8-27)
Aristotle's understanding of things being declared to be 'one' is as follows; he, first 
of all, points out that, in so far as one is infinitely divisible into as many parts as the 
number of things, 'one' is said to be many things. He considers spatial divisibility as
13
well as temporal divisibility {Mel. 1016a7). However, he in the Physics only raises 
a question about the parts which cannot be involved in a whole. Aristotle notices 
the relation between parts which are divided from a whole and the whole which 
does not contain the parts, and asks if the parts and the whole are a unity or a 
plurality. It reminds us of Plato's Third man' argument which requires an infinite 
regress. That is, if there is a form 'B' of a man 'A', for example, then there should be 
another form 'C' of 'A' and 'B', 'D' of 'A', 'B', and 'C', and so on. All the same, in 
order to say that parts and a whole are one, there must be another whole and the 
whole and parts of it again require another whole, and so on, ad infinitum. It calls 
for this infinite regress because it successively requires larger and larger concepts of 
'whole'. Therefore, if this is the case, he asks, how parts and whole are said to be 
'one' {Phy. 185bl7).
Secondly, he conceives that things are said to be one in so far as they are 
indivisibly one. If things are one in that sense, he says, there will be no quantity or 
quality (185b 16-17). It is quite difficult to understand what exactly Aristotle 
means. He probably intends to claim that nothing can exist without having 
properties and that, if there are things which have such properties, they must have 
differences in themselves. However, if my interpretation is right, it does not seem 
plausible for Aristotle to say that there is no quantity or quality. For there is the 
possibility that things might have only one kind of quantity or quality. If things are 
one in the sense of being undivided, then it is true that they do not have any 
differences. However, to say that things cannot have different quantities or qualities 
without being divisible, does not imply that they do not have any quantity or quality 
at all. It might well be assumed that there can be one being which is composed of 
diverse beings which have different qualities or quantities. But it can be simply 
denied since it is absurd to say that, although things are indivisibly one, they can 
have differences in quantity or quality. For something which is differentiated from 
others is that which is already divided. Otherwise, it cannot be said to be 
differentiated from others.
14
Thirdly, Aristotle's objection to things declared to be 'one' is that Heraclitus and 
his successors make being good and being bad or being good and not being good 
the same. If all existing things are one in definition they are the same in the sense of 
being. Aristotle says that if they are one they do not have any difference and 
therefore they are not one but 'not anything' (185b25-26). Again, according to their 
theory, both a man and a horse are one and the same in definition. Then, they are 
not anything since there is nothing by which we can distinguish the one from the 
other. All the traits of a man and a horse are in one and they are in the state of 
being a mixture. What Aristotle claims is, I think, that the components are not 
merely mixed but that they are in confusion; that is, there is not in beings any trait 
by which we can differentiate them from each other. Therefore, he concludes that 
being is 'not anything' rather than 'one'.
After rejecting all the meanings of the presocratic 'one', Aristotle adds further 
explanation by taking examples from ordinary expressions such as, 'the man is 
white’, 'the man is musical', and the like. In these expressions, the subject 'man' 
seems to be many different beings. 'To be what white is' is clearly different from 'to 
be what is white'. That is, 'to be what is white' is not to be whiteness but something 
which has whiteness. Aristotle presents the fundamental difference between them 
as that the former is an accident which belongs to a subject whereas the latter is a 
subject or 'what primarily is' which is not predicated of something else (See Phy. 
186a28-b4).
His definition of the term 'accident' is something which may or may not belong to a 
subject (186b 19-20) and is something which cannot exist without a subject; for 
example, an accident 'sitting' may or may not belong to a subject 'man' and cannot 
exist without reference to the subject. What I mean by 'cannot exist' is that, 
whenever we describe an accident, its real meaning cannot be defined without being 
applied to a subject; an accident 'redness' is hardly possible to be defined without a 
subject being red.
15
In conclusion, Aristotle's belief that beings are many is derived from the thought 
that, for instance, an accident 'musical' or 'educated' is defined by means of the 
definition of a man (186b20-21). And an accident, e.g. being educated, does not 
contain the definition of the whole, e.g. a man; that is, being educated is not 
identified with a man. However, it is an inherent part o f the definition o f a man 
(b24). Thus, a man seems to be many by adding different accidents, for each 
accident is a factor which makes 'what is not' 'what is'. That is, for a man who is 
uneducated to be educated is a coming to be what is from what is not. Thus, this 
way of explanation faces the question of how it is possible for what is to come from 
what is or from what is not.
1.3 What is comes from What is or from What is not
The problem of 'M’hat is coming to be from Mhat is or from what is not' which 
Aristotle tries to expound in the Physics II. 8 is worth examining since this is indeed 
the question of whether change is possible at all. Some commentators have claimed 
that Aristotle does not acknowledge the Parmenidean claim that nothing comes 
from M’hat is or from what is not. However, this is, I think, misleading in virtue of 
the following, admittedly difficult passage:
In their inexperience, those who first sought philosophic truth and the natural development of 
beings were diverted into a wTong course of reasoning. "Nothing comes into being or passes out of 
being," they said, "because whatever comes into being would have to come from what is or from 
what is-not: and both of these alternatives are impossible." They went on to explain: "What is 
does not become anything, since it already is; and nothing comes from what is-not. since 
something must underlie." Thereupon they even went beyond this opinion as they progressively 
amplified its consequences until they came to the conclusion: "There cannot be many beings; only 
being itself is." (191a 24-34)
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In this passage, Aristotle divides the Parmenidean claim into a premise and a 
conclusion. Parmenides' course of reasoning is that, since nothing comes from what 
is or from what is not, change is impossible and so there cannot be many beings. It 
is indeed obscure whether Aristotle refutes both the premise and the conclusion of 
Parmenides. However, it seems that, although Aristotle refutes Parmenides' thesis 
that there is no change at all he might have accepted the Parmenidean basic 
assumption, which draws the thesis, that nothing comes from what is or from what 
is not. That is, what Aristotle denies is the conclusion drawn by a wrong reasoning, 
not the premise. Again, Aristotle seems to conceive that what Parmenides claims as 
to generation, that nothing comes from what is or from what is not, is right. If he 
denied the Parmenidean claim he would not be able to reach the notion of privation. 
That is, as seemed apparent to us, there is becoming or change which seems to 
begin from what is or what is not. Aristotle does not stop at the place where he 
merely accepts the theory that nothing can come from what is or from what is not 
'absolutely', but goes further to enquire, resting on our ordinary experience, into the 
question o f how, then, there can be 'becoming' which we see around us. At this 
stage, he again emphasises on the importance of believing in our ordinary 
experience. It should be again noted here that the fundamental difference between 
Aristotle and Parmenides is that the former has no doubt of our senses whereas the 
latter dismisses them as illusory. Aristotle probably wishes to suggest "open your 
eyes and look around! if there is no change, what are the events happening around 
us and, if they are not changes, how can you explain them?"
If what is were not from what is or from what is not, then there would not be any 
becoming in nature. For what is and what is not are all we can think o f as the origin 
of becoming. However, it seems true to say that nothing comes from either of them 
'as such', and therefore there must be something else in them, namely, something 
inherent in themselves.
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We for our own part agree with them that nothing comes from what "is-not" absolutely, but insist 
that a thing does come from what "is-not" in an incidental sense: it comes from its "privation," 
and this is, by itself, what "is-not"... (Phv. 191b 14-18)
As a result o f the process of reasoning stated above, he concludes that the 
Parmenidean claim is due to failing to understand the proper meaning o f the two 
terms, what is and what is not. So far, the argument o f Aristotle's theory of 
becoming might be summed up by the following passage;
What does it mean "for anything to come from what is or from what is-not"? Or what does it 
mean "for what is-not or for what is to act upon anything or to be acted upon by anything or to 
become anything"? Nothing essentially different from what it means "for a physician to act upon 
anything or to be acted upon by anything or to become anything"!... so that we must distinguish 
two meanings also in such expressions as "coming from what is" and "what is, acts and is acted 
upon."... Clearly, then, [to deny] that anything "comes from what is-not" means, properly, [to 
deny] that anything "comes from what is-not in so far as it is-not" (191a36-bl0)
As so far shown, there are two difficulties here about which Aristotle attempts to 
give an explanation; how it is possible for what is to come from what is and from 
what is not. He first explains what is coming to be from what is not in terms of 
privation. As a physician he cures or fails to cure an illness but does not build a 
house. He may build a house as a house builder, but not as a physician. His 
building a house is some capability which he does not yet have, namely, what is not. 
Therefore, it may well be said that his ability to build a house comes from what is 
not. If he already had the capability of building a house he would not have to 
acquire the capability. But, since he is not a house builder, who has the capability 
of building a house, but a physician (what is), he is able to attain the capability of 
building a house (what is not) [in so far as he is not a house builder]. Thus, a 
physician's having the capability to build a house is that which he does not have
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before; that is, what is is from what is not. Not all physicians can always be house 
builders but some physician may 'incidentally' be a house builder. That is, some 
physician is capable of attaining the capability of building a house in so far as his 
potentiality of being acted on appropriately corresponds to the potentiality of 
acting. This follows Aristotle's saying that what is comes to be from what is not "in 
so far as it is not" (191b 10), a closer examination on this point will be discussed in 
chapter III.
There are two points to which we should pay special attention. First, what is not 
in Aristotle's sense seems to be not nothing but something. It presupposes a subject 
which can have a privation. Therefore, it cannot be nothing in a strict sense. 
Secondly, what is not becoming what is in his sense is change o f a subject with 
reference to an attribute, not change of a subject itself. To avoid any misleading 
suggestion which might occur with regard to the problem of what is it that changes, 
let us briefly read Martin's remarks on 'substance and accident'.
People often talk as if the accidents were that which can change, and the substance that which 
does not change: this is very alien to the manner of speaking of Aristotle and Aquinas. For them, 
it is precisely the substance that changes, that is the subject of change: the accidents do not 
change at all. strictly speaking. They merely (in some sense) cease to exist and come into 
existence.6
What Martin wishes to say is that there cannot be any accident without 
presupposing a substance and that, similarly, there is no substance which does not 
have any accident. It should be noted that change always presupposes something 
which changes (Phy. 190al6-17) and is from something to something else (189b33- 
34). That is, change is of a substance that has accidents.
6 Martin, op.cit., pp. 62-63.
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Let us return to our main discussion of what is coming into existence from what is 
not. Since we have reached the point that what is not presupposes a subject which 
has a privation we are required to distinguish whether he means privation is the 
privation of what is not or what is not itself. If it is the former then what is not is 
not absolutely what is not, but in a sense what is, since what is not absolutely cannot 
be anything, namely, it is nothing. And if it is the latter case then what is not must 
presuppose some subject, which can have the privation, in order that there should 
be 'becoming'. In brief, Aristotle's attempt is not to solve the problem of nothing 
becoming something, but to solve the problem of a subject which has a privation 
coming to acquire the attribute that it lacked.
Aristotle moves on to sort out the next difficulty of how it is possible for what is 
to come from what is. Although he does not state it clearly, he probably adopts 
here again the notion of privation. That is to say, what is comes from the privation 
of what is; what is comes from what is 'in so far as what is is not'. But, in effect, the 
latter phrase should be understood as 'what is is not merely what is'. This 
interpretation applies to the problem of what is coming from what is not, too. 
Otherwise, what is becomes what is not, what is not what is. In answering the 
difficulty, he takes an example of a substance's coming into existence. The relevant 
passage, which is obscure, concerning the second difficulty of becoming reads thus;
The point at issue is as if we argued about an animal coming from an animal, a particular animal 
from a particular animal, a dog from a horse: the dog would come not only from a particular 
animal but from "an animal," but would not therefore come into being as an animal since this 
[character] is already there; if a particular animal is to come into being not incidentally but 
absolutely, w hat it will come from is not an "animal". Similarly, if  any being is to come into being 
[in an absolute sense], it will not come from what is any more that it will come from what is-not 
(namely, as we have said, in so far as the latter is-not). Moreover, we are not denying that 
"amlhing either is or is-not" [which is implicitly denied in the opinion we have been examining]. 
(191M9-25)
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What is, then, Aristotle's sense of what isl For a dog to beget a puppy there 
should be the form of the dog and some matter to become the puppy. But it is 
undeniable that the puppy will be different from the dog in shape, in size, etc. The 
matter which is the cause of begetting the puppy is also different from that of 
which the puppy is made. What is it that is to beget a puppy? There are a dog, 
form, and matter. On the other hand, a form of a puppy, matter o f which it is 
composed, and its becoming what is are that which did not exist until it is bom. 
Without considering these complex problems Aristotle, in the Physics, seems 
naively to explain that a puppy which did not exist in the past comes into existence 
from a dog which has existed.
As we have so far seen, although Aristotle does believe that he solves the problem 
of becoming by adopting the notion of privation, the problem is not yet sufficiently 
answered. For privation seems merely an empty space and therefore it requires 
some power to fill it in. Is this power the potentiality which Aristotle defines as an 
originative source of change? We may leave it unsolved until we have examined his 
distinction between potentiality and actuality.
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C hapter II
A ristotle’s Conception of Change
As we have discussed, Aristotle is now entitled to some extent to claim the 
possibility o f change in nature. Where does change start from? Aristotle 
understands change as coming about between a pair of contraries, for example, 
between musical and unmusical. And he conceives that the Presocratic contraries 
are also first principles which are beginnings of many beings. Therefore, at this 
stage we are to enquire into the questions how far his belief is plausible and what 
are the characteristics of contraries. .And in order fully to understand the role of 
privation which appears with reference to contraries and as an introductory part of 
proceeding to investigate the notion of potentiality which is said to be an originative 
source of movement {Met. 1046a23), we are now required to enquire further into 
Aristotle's conception of change.
II. 1 The Genesis of Changeable Subjects
From earlier analysis of Aristotle's criticisms of the Presocratic principles we 
reached a conclusion that he, like the Presocratics, admits the notion of the first 
principle as the beginning of many beings. Whether there is a single principle or a 
plurality of principles, from the definition of the first principle there must be 
"becoming" as long as there is something called the first principle and as long as it 
itself is or they themselves are not many beings. Aristotle's definition of principles is 
(1) that they are not to be derived from one another or from anything else, but (2) 
that they are themselves the beginnings of everything {Phy. 188a27-29). And also
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he assumes that "all beings that are naturally produced are contraries or are 
composed of contraries" (188b27-28). Thus, it is clear that what Aristotle adopts 
as first principles is contraries.
Some take the contraries which are more intelligible in the order of reason, namely, the universal 
(since reason grasp the universal) ... : whereas others take the contraries more accessible in the 
order of sense perception, namely, the particular (since sense perception grasp the particular) ... 
At any rate, it is evident that our principles must be contraries.1 (Phy. 189a6-l 1)
The concept of contraries is. as the passage above shows, already pervasive among 
the Presocratics and the Platonists; Anaximenes introduces the notion of rarefaction 
and condensation, the Pythagoreans of odd and even, Parmenides of earth and fire, 
Democritus of aggregation and separation, Empedocles of love and strife, and so 
forth. Thus, all o f these thinkers directly or indirectly take note of the importance 
o f the concept of contraries. However, Aristotle does not accept any of his 
predecessors' principles as proper principles.
It seems clear that Aristotle's contraries are, as we might infer from the passage 
cited above, different from those of others. His principles are the most universal in 
the sense that for him contraries themselves are principles whereas others take less 
universal, namely, particular contraries, such as the great and the small, the dense 
and the rare, or the like. In other words, the contraries of the Presocratics show 
that they are examples of contraries rather than contraries themselves. Accordingly, 
as he himself notices, Aristotle's notion of contraries as first principles is the largest 
concept.
... there cannot be more than one pair of contraries, since primary being is but one [and the same] 
genus of beings: its principles will therefore differ from one another in priority and subsequence
7 The italicized sentence is my emphasis.
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only; these will not differ in genus since there is in any single genus a single pair o f  contraries to 
which all the pairs o f  contraries may be reduced f  (189b24-29)
Aristotle supposes that the Presocratics also believe the contraries as principles but 
this hardly seems plausible. For their contraries seem to be adopted to assist beings 
which come into existence; that is to say, they are forces or causes to help the first 
principle that brings about many beings. He takes Parmenides' and Democritus' 
contraries as examples of principles: it is not apparent whether he thinks that only 
their contraries are principles or those of the other Presocratics are principles as 
well. However, it is thought that he seems to treat all the Presocratics' principles as 
the first principle. Since Aristotle in the Physics 1.5 explicitly criticizes the two 
Presocratics, Parmenides and Democritus, we are now to examine whether their 
contraries may well be called first principles, in accordance with Aristotle's 
terminology, which is the genesis of many beings.
To argue this thesis what we need to know is where these contraries are coming 
from and whether they are the beginning of all the beings. However, it is indeed 
difficult to find any relevant passage to the genesis of the contraries in the fragments 
of the Presocratics or in Aristotle's own writings. We might assume that the notion 
of contraries is derived as an attempt to explain how it is possible for many beings 
to come from the first principle. For the Presocratics' common belief was that the 
first principle itself does not have any power to bring about other beings 
spontaneously. Therefore, the Presocratics required such a notion.
In analysing Parmenides' contraries, we should first point out that Parmenides's 
adopting the notion o f contraries is contradictory. For the notion that Parmenides 
has in mind is hardly possible for anybody who does not admit the possibility that 
there is change since the definition of the first principle implies change, becoming,
8 The italicized paragraph is my emphasis.
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or movement. Nevertheless, Parmenides indeed shows inconsistency in adopting 
the notion in an argument about cosmology. He is said to claim thus:
The air is separated off from the earth, vaporized owing to the earth's stronger compression: the 
sun is an exhalation of fire, and so is the circle of the Milky Way. The moon is compounded of 
both air and fire. Aither is outermost, surrounding all; next comes the fiery thing that we call the 
sky; and last comes the region of the earth.9
As stated in an earlier stage, for contraries to be able to be first principles in 
Aristotle's terminology7 they must satisfy the two conditions; (1) everything must 
come from contraries and (2) they are not derived from anything. Contraries are of 
course composed of two opposite terms. Therefore, in order for it to be said that 
they are beginnings of everything, beings, Aristotle maintains, should come from 
their mixture or from both of them, not from only one o f them.
... everything that comes into being or passes away comes from or passes into one of a pair of 
contrary states or a state intermediate between them; and since the intermediate states are 
composed of contraries (colors, for example, of light and dark shades)... (Phy. 188b23-28)
But the fragment about the Parmenidean contraries, i.e. fire and earth, quoted above 
seems to suggest that different beings are originated from just one of them; the air is 
from the earth whereas the sun is from fire. Therefore, Parmenides' contraries seem 
not to be first principles as Aristotle analyses. As often pointed out by 
commentators, it is hard to deny Aristotle's remarks on the Presocratics since we 
are indebted to him for preserving a great deal of their thought. Nonetheless, we 
cannot help thinking that it is quite curious that Aristotle does not notice the 
fundamental difference between his and their notion of contraries. In brief, the
9 DK 28A 37, in G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield (eds.), The Presocratic Philosophers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991), pp. 258-259.
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difference is that for Aristotle beings come into existence from both contraries or 
from their mixture, whereas for Parmenides they can be originated from just one of 
contraries.
The fact that not all the Presocratic contraries can be defined as first principles is 
more clearly revealed when we examine Democritus. For Democritus, innumerable 
atoms are the primary bodies and their change is a result o f collisions.
For they [sc. Leucippus and Democritus] say that their primary' magnitudes are infinite in number 
and indivisible in magnitude; rather all things are generated by the intertwining and scattering 
around of these primary magnitudes.10
This passage clearly shows that the contraries, "intertwining" and "scattering", are 
efficient causes rather than first principles which is the beginnings of beings in 
Aristotle’s sense. Aristotle seems to confuse the problem of "how" [or of "by"] with 
that o f "where" [or o f "from"]. Again, the contraries of Democritus are not 
themselves the origin of beings, but efficient causes which are "the principle of 
individuation causing the emergence of differences and giving rise to a plurality of 
substances and determinations".11 Thus, it is clear that Democritus's contraries are 
not principles in Aristotle's own definition since atoms precede them.
As we have seen, even though the conclusion is drawn by Aristotle's 
misunderstanding his predecessor's contraries, he reaches the most universal notion 
of contraries to which other contraries are reduced and which are the genesis of 
many beings that change. However, it is still obscure what they are and what 
characteristics they have. At this stage, one might raise the question whether 
contraries possess matter since they are defined as the genesis of beings.
10 Ibid., p. 424.
11 J.P. Anton, Aristotle's Theory o f  Contrariety (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 37.
|
f
26
.. all things which are generated from their contraries involve an underlying subject; a subject, 
then, must be present in the case of contraries, if anywhere. All contraries, then, are always 
predicable of a subject, and none can exist apart, but just as appearances suggest that there is 
nothing contrary to substance, argument confirms this. No contrary, then, is the first principle of 
all things in the full sense; the first principle is something different. (Met. 1087a36-b4)
For Aristotle, "a pair of contraries alone is not sufficient, although necessary, for 
understanding any substance or process, because no given contrariety in itself can 
constitute a substance or a process".12 Aristotle therefore presupposes a primary' 
being which is not constituted by both contraries at the same time. However, he 
nowhere gives a clear account of the question why contraries cannot constitute a 
substance. Nonetheless, it is presumed that it is because they are abstractions which 
do not contain any matter.
On the other hand, once it is admitted that they are predicable of a subject it is 
clear why they are not to be present in a subject at the same time. If he considers of 
contraries as forces which are present at the same time in a subject they are not first 
principles because, for Aristotle, first principles are defined as the beginnings of 
everything, not as efficient causes. And if they are present at the same time in the 
same subject the number of the first principles cannot be more than one, as some of 
the Presocratics claim. For in that case the origin of beings is the subject, whatever 
it may be, and the role of contraries is only restricted to control the grades of 
beings in producing the beings. In other words, the existence of contraries 
presupposes a subject and the source of beings might be the subject rather than the 
contraries. Let us consult the Metaphysics to find the concise exposition of the 
uses of contraries.
1: Ibid.. p. 33.
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The term "contrary" is applied (1) to those attributes differing in genus which cannot belong at the 
same time to the same subject. (2) to the most different of the things in the same genus, (3) to the 
most different of the attributes in the same recipient subject. (4) to the most different of the things 
that fall under the same faculty. (5) to the things whose difference is greatest either absolutely or 
in genus or in species. (Met. 1018a25-32)
It may well be inferred from the passage cited above that Aristotle conceives that 
one of the contraries should be present in a subject; for example, hot should be 
present in fire and cold in snow but hot and cold cannot be present in fire at the 
same time. Thus, it is concluded from our discussion so far that for Aristotle 
contraries are contrary' attributes invoking an underlying subject, which cannot be 
present in the subject at the same time. Thus, the question concerning the relation 
between a primary being, or a subject, and contraries leads us to the question of the 
relation between a subject and privation, and possession.
The primary contrariety is that between positive state and privation - not even privation, however 
(for 'privation' has several meanings), but that which is complete. And the other contraries must 
be called so with reference to these, some because they possess these, others because they produce 
or tend to produce them, others because they are acquisitions or losses of these or of other 
contraries. (Met. 1055a33-38)
It is however quite obscure how contraries which are 'the beginnings o f many 
beings' are said to be contraries between privation and possession. Thus, it might 
well be presumed that for Aristotle contraries are principles of change rather than 
principles of existence. For if they were the latter they would not necessarily 
require any subject since they do not have to keep their identity throughout change; 
that is, beings come into existence from themselves and cease to exist, and then 
there remains nothing that we can identify throughout their change. But if they 
were the principles in the former sense they would have to involve a subject which
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persists throughout change. For change is the process from something to 
something else and always presupposes something that persists throughout the 
change. Thus, in order to fully grasp the characteristics of contraries we are now 
required to examine Aristotle’s conception of change.
II.2 The Four Types of Change
As we have just seen, the concept of contraries is one of Aristotle's major 
assumptions which underlie his thought in analysing change. Aristotle's basic 
thought is that change is a process from something to something else or something 
different (Phy. 189b33-34). For example, when we say a non-educated man 
becomes an educated man, it is clear that the former is different from the latter and 
therefore we may well say that there is change. The man becoming educated can be 
easily ascertained through some test and we at once know that there is change in 
the man. As the example shows, for change to be possible there must be a pair of 
contraries since change is a process from something to something else, and so there 
must be a difference between them, and there is something that persists throughout 
the change. In other words, change is a process from something old to something 
new, i.e. from uneducated to educated. Thus, in a sense change involves a 
replacement of contraries; that is, as Waterlow states,13 "the uneducated that 
becomes educated cannot still be uneducated; nor can it already have been 
educated: this is ruled out by the mutual exclusion of contraries".14 However, it is 
not the case that without any subject which persists uneducated is replaced with 
educated. That is, the change is from uneducated to educated in a subject, a man
13 S. Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s  Physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1982). p. 13.
14 I replace Waterlow's word 'cultured' with 'educated' and 'uncultured' with 'uneducated' to show 
the consistency in this writing.
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who persists throughout the change. In addition, there cannot be any change 
without involving difference.
For one to be differentiated from another there must be difference between them. 
Aristotle maintains that there are as many kinds of movement and change as there 
are of being (P h y . 201a9-10). For attributes are involved in a subject; attributes 
cannot be apart from a subject and the reverse. Let us sum up our discussion so far 
in Aristotle's own words.
... when we say that "a noneducated man becomes an educated man." Also, we say either that "the 
noneducated becomes educated." or that "it is from the noneducated that the educated comes to 
be"; but we do not say that "it is from a man that the educated comes to be." but rather that "a man 
becomes educated." Of the subjects simply designated as such in these assertions of "becoming." 
the latter endures, whereas the former does not. For a "man" endures as such, that is. he is a 
"man" even when he has become "educated"; but the "noneducated" or "uneducated" does not 
endure as such, and neither does the "noneducated man" or the "uneducated man." ... we find that 
change always presupposes something which changes... (190a2-32)
We have so far examined the example of a non-educated man’s becoming an 
educated man. An educated man is composed of a subject and a form; a man is a 
subject or matter15 which persists throughout change and a state of being educated 
is a form which comes from a state of being non-educated, a privation that the man 
has.
As shown above, Aristotle takes two terminal points in a change, its beginning and 
end. Change might well be therefore defined as a process in a subject from a 
privation to a form, an actuality. Thus, we now have three factors, matter, form, 
and privation, that are involved in change. The concept of privation implies that the
15 T. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1988),p. 210.
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form was not at the beginning of the change.16 As we shall see in the next chapter, 
it is to be noted that privation is a mere empty space where a form can be filled in 
and so it is not potentiality. Therefore, Aristotle says that what tends towards a 
form is matter (Phy. 192a24) rather than privation as such. He seems to attach the 
notion of potentiality to matter. Without potentiality nothing can have any tendency 
to change.
Let us now examine Aristotle's classification of four types of change. Although 
Aristotle says that the kinds of change are as many as the number of beings he 
thinks that they are reduced to four types; change in quantity, in quality, in place, 
and in substance. The first three changes are of attributes which have varying 
degree in them. So the process to complete the difference of degree is explained as 
change.
As we shall see later on, change is of attributes involving a subject, not of 
substance itself for there is no varying degree in substance and because substance is 
not involved in contraries. In defining quantitative change, Aristotle also maintains 
that quantities have no contraries (Cat. 5bl l )  and do not admit of variation of 
degree (6a 19). Quantitative change is growth or diminution or, more likely, 
completeness and incompleteness. When something is increasing or decreasing we 
understand it by adopting contrary notions such as great or small, much or little, or 
the like. But there are no things which are absolutely great or small. For example, 
when we say that a mountain is small, or that an insect is great, they are so called 
with reference to other external things. Aristotle, therefore, believes that small is 
not strictly the contrary of great. For if they are contraries then one and the same 
thing would be both great and small; for example, if they are contrary terms, when 
we say a man is great compared with an insect but small compared with a whale, the 
man comes to be both great and small at the same time. But this is impossible. 
Therefore, they are not contraries of one and the same subject, but relatives. Since
16 A. Edel. Aristotle and His Philosophy (London: Croom Helm, 1982). p. 56.
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quantities cannot be considered apart from a subject it might well be said that they 
have no contraries. Aristotle continues to argue that quantities have no varying 
degree.
One thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly with regard to 
number: what is Mthree" is not more truly three than what is ”five" is five; nor is one set of three 
more truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly time than 
another. (Cat. 6al9-24)
Nonetheless, he maintains change is still possible. For all the categories of 
quantity fall under being equal or unequal. They are relative terms which can have 
contraries. And they also admit of variation of degree. One and the same subject 
becomes both great and small when it is said with reference to the external standard.
Although Aristotle does not mention that the theory is also applied to one subject 
which is not compared with other external things, one and the same subject is called 
great or small by adopting the notion of time. A boy who is small at one time is 
called great when he becomes an adult at another time. Thus, small and great are 
relative terms rather than absolutely contrary terms. This characteristic of quantity 
is that which is different from that of substance. Aristotle claims that no substance 
is relative {Cat. 8a 13). For one and the same subject a "man” cannot be more or 
less than a man himself. To sum up, although quantities, like substance, neither 
admit varying degree nor have contraries, since they are composed o f relative terms, 
quantitative change is possible.
On the other hand, qualitative change is described as alteration in contraries. This 
category means the differentia of the essence {Mel. 1020a33) and one quality may 
be the contrary of the other {Cat. 10b 12); heat and cold, whiteness and blackness, 
evil and good, and so on. Thus, qualitative change occurs between two contraries. 
If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality (10b 19-20). 
Aristotle continues to say that qualities admit of variation of degree; for instance.
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whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. He 
also admits the fact that there are some exceptions in mathematical terms, such as 
triangular and quadrangular. These are relative terms. And so Aristotle performs 
the same course of reasoning as he does in explaining quantitative change. The 
contraries of change in place are up and down.
...upward motion is contrary to downward motion in length, motion to the right is contrary to 
motion to the left in breadth, and forward motion is contraiy to backward motion [in depth], (Phy. 
229b7-10)
Aristotle connects natural locomotion with place, time, infinity, self-motion, and so 
on. And a great part of the Physics is focused on analysing their relation. 
Therefore, it might well be said that locomotion is fundamental change in Aristotle's 
thesis.
Finally, we are now to turn to explicate change in substance, that is, substantial 
change. As shown in the introduction, Aristotle distinguishes two types of change, 
substantial change, and non-substantial change.
Since, then, we must distinguish (a) the substratum . and (b) the property whose nature it is to be 
predicated of the substratum', and since change of each of these occurs: there is 'alteration' when 
the substratum  is perceptible and persists, but change in its own properties in question being 
opposed to one another either as contraries or as intermediates... But when nothing perceptible 
persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes as a whole .... such an occurrence is 
no longer 'alteration'. It is a coming-to-be of one substance and a passing-away of the other - 
especially if the change proceeds from an imperceptible something to something perceptible... 
(Gen. Corr. 319b8-21)
What makes it difficult for us to understand substantial change is that it involves the 
problem of identity as opposed to the other types of change. In other types of
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change, it is apparent that subjects are maintained throughout the change. In 
quantitative change, the same balloon which is small comes to be bigger. In 
qualitative change, the same leaves which are green turn red. In locomotion, the 
same man who is here at one time is there at another time. Thus, the same subject 
persisting is easily observed. However, in the cases of substantial change, for 
example, a seed becoming a plant or when a female dog's womb meets a male dog's 
sperm, becoming a puppy, it is difficult to grasp what is the subject that undergoes 
change. We might assume that there is something that persists through substantial 
change. But it must not be substance. For, as analysed, substance has neither 
contraries nor varying degree. Thus, we may summarise that change in substance 
does not mean change of substance itself, but of something else. That which 
survives change is matter; some matter in a seed or in a womb and a sperm. Then 
we again reach the conclusion that what changes is an attribute in matter. 
However, as A. Edel indicates17, to sort out the problem of the nature of substantial 
change we are in effect required to analyse what substance is since the theory of 
change alone is not sufficient to answer it.
In the following chapter, the role of the three factors, form, matter, and privation 
raised in the basic analysis of change will be closely examined with reference to 
Aristotle's distinction between potentiality and actuality.
17 Ibid., p. 59.
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C hapter III
The Notion of Privation and Potentiality
It is often the case that, even if we begin our research in philosophy with aiming to 
restrict ourselves to tangible or observable objects, we find ourselves 
unintentionally stepping into the realm o f metaphysics. If we simply define 
metaphysics as a subject which deals with unobservable and abstract objects the 
subject matter, change, with which we are mainly concerned is also, in a sense, a 
metaphysical concept. This is, needless to say, because there is no such natural 
phenomenon called change in a universal sense; the change we observe and name is 
a particular change, not universal. It may be true to say that in order to explain 
physical events, we are irresistibly required to adopt some metaphysical notions, 
such as privation and potentiality. This stage is where Aristotle adopts such notions 
to verify the possibility of change.
III. 1 Matter, Form, and Privation
As we have so far considered, it may well be claimed that a thing is composed of 
three factors, namely, form, matter, and privation. This raises the question whether 
for Aristotle privation is also a constituent of a thing. We will return to this 
question later, but first we will examine the characteristics of the three terms as 
Aristotle uses them. At any rate, it may be presumed that form and matter are the 
components of a thing which allow us to observe and that privation is room for 
change.
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Apart from the ambiguity of the definition of substance, Aristotle conceives that 
there are two kinds of substance; the concrete thing which presupposes matter and 
the formula in its generality (Met. 1039b20-22). The examples of substance in the 
former sense are individual or particular subjects, such as a man, a horse, and so on, 
whereas those in the latter sense are universal concepts, such as man, horse, and the 
like. According to Aristotle, substances which are composed of matter are capable 
of generation or of destruction. On the other hand, there is no destruction or 
generation of the substance in the latter sense. For what is generated is the being of 
this particular house, not the being of house in an abstract sense. Thus, Aristotle 
maintains that what can change is substance in the former sense. Aristotle believes 
that for beings which are first substances to be many they must not be continuous 
and that the matter of which they are composed must be divisible in kind. For a 
thing, to be divided into many, there must be differentia in it. For this reason, he 
says that matter contains differentia or quality (Met. 1024b8-9). Also, even if many 
beings are composed of the same matter, they are distinguished by the differentia of 
form. This shows that there is no sensible being which does not consist of matter 
and form. Thus, the differentia of matter or form is the ground for many beings.
However, change cannot be explained only by the components of matter and form 
since they are what-it-is as such, without any type of motion; that is to say, they 
only designate a state of stasis. Moreover, they might show the state o f being fully 
filled or complete. Therefore, for Aristotle it is required to suppose a state o f being 
not fully filled in a subject, namely, a state o f lacking. For this reason, he adopts the 
notion of privation and considers change as filling in the state of privation. It might 
be an answer to the question of how there can be change of beings; that is, the 
notion of privation shows the possibility of change.
Aristotle explains the notion of privation in the Physics II.9 by distinguishing 
matter from privation.
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We ourselves distinguish a "material" and a "privative" aspect: the material factor incidentally is- 
not [what it becomes], whereas what we call the "privation" is essentially what is-not-[vet]: also, a 
material is in some sense almost even if not quite a primary being, whereas a "privation" is not a 
primary being in any way at all. (192a4-8)
With Aristotle's remarks here, we cannot grasp in what sense privation or matter is 
is-not. However, since the two notions are compared with each other, one might 
naturally attempt to understand them in the same respect. We may easily see in 
what sense privation is said to be what-is-not from a definition of the term in an 
ordinary sense; that is, it designates a state of lacking. Thus, the state of privation is 
to be disappeared when it is filled with something. However, it is to be recalled 
that, as shown in chapter 1.3 by citing Martin's remarks, there cannot be any change 
without presupposing a subject which persists throughout change. Therefore, it 
might be concluded that, since matter as such does not require any change, for 
change to be possible matter should be in a state of privation.
In conclusion, that privation is said to be essentially what-is-not designates that 
matter should be in a state of privation for change to be possible.
Privation, as a principle in ontological analysis, acquires significant content in connection with a 
given locus in two possible way's: (a) it means relative absence of a determinate capacity in respect 
to degree of fulfilment, and (b) it indicates the complete absence of an aspect, or stands for a 
certain determinate incapability and loss.18
However, matter cannot be explained in this way. For if there is no matter of 
which beings are composed then it follows that there cannot be anything and that 
nothing can become anything; there is no change at all. For beings, too, presuppose 
matter. Aristotle does not assume that matter which did not exist in the past
18 Anton, op.cit., p. 79.
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suddenly appears in the present; that is to say, matter is indestructible and 
unproducible.
Were matter produced, matter would therefore have been before it arose! But "matter" is by 
definition the "first" persistent being out of which anything arises and which inheres in the 
product in a way that is not incidental. So. too, if matter were destroyed, it would pass into matter 
in the end; hence, matter would have perished before it perished. (192a31-36)
Thus, we might be able to assume that he intends to show the possibility of form 
without matter in thought (this point is raised in De Anima where Aristotle deals 
with the problem of soul and body but for the present purpose we are to leave it 
unexamined) or to emphasize that except for form there cannot be anything which 
does not contain matter. Once again, natural beings or sensible substances, which 
are composed of matter, form, and, possibly, privation, are changeable. However, 
the notion o f privation as a component is simply excluded since, as examined so far, 
it is only a state that allows the possibility of change.
Although we have assumed that privation is a state of matter it might be 
worthwhile to question whether the privation is of form or of matter since there is 
another factor, form, other than matter which constitutes a thing.
Matter in the chief and strictest sense is the substratum that admits of generation and corruption 
[or coming-to-be and passing-away]; but in some sense the substratum of the other kind of change 
is also matter. {Gen. Corr. 320a2-5)
Even if matter is claimed to persist through change it does not follow that it does 
not change. On the other hand, form seems to be quite a plausible candidate to be 
something that changes. However, this is the same case as privation that nothing 
which does not presuppose a subject which persists throughout change can change. 
In all the opposite changes that occur matter is said to be something which underlies
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the changes (Met. 1042a33). And the four types of change, which were expounded 
in the previous section, show various types of particular forms. Evans also suggests 
that between the material constituents of a thing and its structure and organisation 
(form) the matter is the subject and the form is an attribute which it possesses.19 It 
is quite plausible. For, in changeable subjects which are composed of matter and 
form, if matter is persistent then it follows that one form is replaced by another. 
Change which is defined as a process from one opposite to the other may be also 
defined as a process from one form to an opposite form. Then, it follows that form 
is an attribute of matter. When we adopt the notion of privation it becomes clear. 
That is, change is, for example, bricks which are potentially a house. And so when 
they are completely attained or actualised the forms are called actualities.
Let us turn to the question whether matter itself changes. This should be applied 
to change in substance because the curiosity concerning matter largely occurs from 
the change. For example, when a seed becomes a plant we are not able to 
distinguish what is the matter which persists through change. In this case, we do 
not see if there is any change in matter itself. Let us take one more example. If we 
remove all the attributes and essence given to a man what remains is a certain form 
of matter, so called prime matter. It seems to me that for Aristotle it is of no 
importance whatever may be prime matter although he refers to four kinds of prime 
matter; earth, water, air and fire. One might be curious what the ultimate 
substratum which persists throughout the change will be when air becomes fire or a 
dead body becomes earth. It must be true that there is change. But it is difficult to 
see what persists through change. An explanation to this curiosity might be found 
at the beginning of the Physics where he suggests that our investigation in the 
science of nature should begin ffom what is immediately intelligible to what is not 
immediately intelligible to us. In other words, he might imply that the ultimate 
matter will in the end reach matter-ness. That is to say, when air becomes fire air
19 Evans, op.cit. p. 65.
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and fire are thought to be different. However, whatever kind it may be what 
persists in the two elements is matter-ness; they are the same in the sense that there 
is matter. This might be the course of reasoning which human beings can reach 
starting from sensory perception.
In conclusion, change is now defined as a process from a state of privation to a 
state of possession, form. It might be said that it is generally change of form in so 
far as it presupposes matter which persists throughout the change. As diverse 
attributes are involved in a subject, matter can have diverse kinds of forms. When a 
small green tomato finally becomes a big red tomato 'small' and 'green' are forms in 
the state of lacking the forms, 'big' and 'red'. That the matter of the tomato comes 
to possess those forms is said to be change. But without presupposing the state of 
possession privation cannot be thought, for privation is the privation of the state of 
possession.
III.2 The Notion of Potentiality
As we have seen, diverse explanations can be given to describe a seed which is 
capable of becoming a plant, it is composed of the matter and form of a seed, it is in 
a state of lacking the form of a plant, and its matter is potentially a plant. Aristotle 
identifies the matter of a seed, which persists even when it becomes a plant, with 
potentiality and the form of a seed and that of a plant with actuality. And he 
believes that actuality is the fulfilment of the state of privation which is not yet 
actualised and which is capable of being filled, or the fulfilment of potentiality which 
means the capability to be actualised. Since we have defined privation as a mere 
empty space which designates that there is no source of change we are here mainly 
concerned with the problem of how, then, change is possible, or what is the real 
source of change, in terms of potentiality which is said to be an originative source 
o f change {Met. 1046a8-15)
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And, one more subject dealt with in this section is how Aristotle can defend 
himself with the distinction between the notion of potentiality and actuality against 
the problems, such as the problem of the one and the many (Phy. 186a5), of what is 
becoming from what is or from what is not (191b26-28), or the like. For, although 
Aristotle in the Physics does not give a precise account o f the distinction between 
potentiality and actuality for the reason that he has expounded it elsewhere (b28- 
29), we can often find his attempt to sort out, with the distinction, many of the 
problems occurred in the work. Hence, it might be worthwhile to examine 
Aristotle's probable solutions for these problems.
Aristotle conceives of potentiality as a source of movement or change in another 
thing, as a factor which moves another thing, rather than as a factor in the same 
thing in so far as it is not itself. But he also thinks that it is the source of a thing's 
being moved by another thing or by itself in so far as it is not itself. When he 
explains potentialities between two objects there is no difficulty in understanding; a 
doctor can heal a patient and a patient can be healed by a doctor. However, when 
he explains them in one and the same thing it is more or less hard to follow. 
Therefore, in order to understand the notion of potentiality, we are required to 
carefully examine the meaning of the clause, "in so far as (or qua)..", which is used 
in expounding potentialities in a thing.
For Aristotle, there are two types of potentialities, of acting and of being acted on, 
and change is a transaction between the mover and the moved in which the 
potentialities of both are brought to joint fulfilment.20 This reminds us of Aristotle's 
claim that change should admit of contraries and that such change is a process from 
one opposite to the other. That is to say, Aristotle pertinently maintains that change 
occurs between contraries, between acting and being acted on.
20. Edel. op.cit., p. 84.
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Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of degree. Heating is the 
contrary of cooling, being healed of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit of 
contraries. (Cat. l lb l-5 )
Aristotle maintains that "everything moved is moved by a moved mover" (Phy. 
201a27). And therefore, even though a thing seems to move spontaneously, it is in 
effect moved by something else in it. There are at least two factors in kind in a 
thing; one is that which moves and the other is that which is moved by it. Hence, 
what the clause "in so far as..." indicates is that, when one potentiality affects or 
acts, the other should be acted on. For example, when a doctor who is ill heals 
himself, his being healed is not as a doctor, but as a patient. Conversely, his healing 
himself is not as a patient, but as a doctor. Therefore, the potentialities, to act and 
to be acted on, are different in the sense that, according to Aristotle, one 
potentiality is in the agent and the other is in the patient.
Obviously, then, in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be 
'capable' either because it can itself be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), 
but in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the thing acted on: it is because it 
contains a certain originative source, and because even the matter is an originative source, that the 
thing acted on is acted on. and one thing by one. another by another... (Met. 1046a 19-24)
In the passage above, Aristotle also states that the potentiality of being and of 
being acted on is one. The passage might be construed in three ways. Firstly, even 
though the potentiality of acting is in the agent and that o f being acted on is in the 
patient, they are one in the sense that in their degree, or amount, to change or to be 
changed is the same as the other. That is to say, when water is heated by fire the 
degree of the potentiality of the water's being heated should be exactly the same as 
that of the potentiality of the fire's heating it. For example, for water to be heated 
to five degrees fire should heat it exactly at five degrees, not over or below.
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Secondly, the two potentialities are one in the sense that they move towards the 
same actuality; for example, the potentiality of water and of fire move towards 
being hot. Thirdly, they are said to be one in the sense that a thing may act on 
something else and something else may act on it. In other words, the potentiality of 
acting and of being acted on are one since what is acted on can be capable o f acting 
on something else. This interpretation gives rise to a question. For if, in a thing, 
acting can play the role of being acted on, and being acted on of acting, then all 
changes in the thing would be internal and they do not need any external factor to 
act and to be acted on since the internal factor in a thing can play both the roles, 
acting and being acted on. Therefore, for a thing to change, it does not call for any 
other external cause as a necessary efficient cause.
How, then, is it possible for a thing, which does not necessarily require any 
external force to change, to be connected with the external factor? Aristotle never 
explains the relationship between agent and patient. However, we may find the 
solution from his distinction between the potentialities in the sense of internal 
factors in a thing. That is to say, apart from the potentiality which is able to play 
both the roles, there might be two more types of potentialities which can play only 
one role, acting or being acted on. Therefore, although Aristotle does not give us 
the ground for the connection between one thing and another, between agent and 
patient, we may well assume that, if there is an internal agent or an internal patient 
factor in a thing, it may require external factors to change. But it still does not 
follow that the internal factors must require external factors. Therefore, we are 
again required to adopt the notion of privation. The potentialities which play only 
one role call for the other potentialities which play the opposite role to fill the state 
of privation. But why the state should be filled still remains unanswered.
What is peculiar to Aristotle's notion of potentiality is that it should be performed 
'well'. This point is closely associated with teleology: that what changes always 
tends towards good. Such a characteristic is in the agent as well as in the patient. 
Aristotle supposes that there are two kinds of potentialities; a rational potentiality
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and a non-rational potentiality. The former, which is in all productive forms of 
knowledge, requires a rational soul and is capable of contrary effects; for example, 
the art of building can produce both building and destroying. On the other hand, 
Aristotle assumes that potentiality which is an originative source is also present in 
soulless or lifeless things, such as the hot or the cold; the hot is capable only of 
heating and the cold of freezing. This sort brings about only one effect. This is 
called a one-way process, whereas the rational potentiality is a two-way process, 
e.g. a doctor produces both disease and health (Met. 1046b6). However, this is 
also in a sense a one-way process for it applies rather to positive fact (1046b 10).
The states in virtue of which things are absolutely impassive or unchangeable, or not easily 
changed for the worse, are called potencies: for things are broken and crushed and in general 
destroyed not by having a potency but by not having one and by lacking something, and things are 
impassive with respect to such processes if they are scarcely and slightly affected by them, because 
of a "potency" and because they "can" do something and are in some positive state. (1019a 26-34)
The grounds for his claim that what leads to a bad result is not having a potency or 
a potentiality, but not having one, become clear with respect to his other assertion 
that actuality is prior to potentiality (1049b5). Firstly, it is prior in formula. For the 
capability of seeing presupposes something which can have the capability. For 
example, a man's capability of seeing is from the man who has eyes, not the man 
from his capability; a man should have an eye to see prior to having the capability of 
seeing. Secondly, it is prior in time. Matter which is potentially a puppy, or which 
is potentiality, in a female dog is prior in time to actuality which is not yet a puppy. 
However, actuality is prior to potentiality because from the potentially existing, 
matter, the actually existing, a puppy, is always produced by something actually 
existing, a dog; that is, a dog comes from a dog which already is. But there is no 
end of one presupposing another since an actuality is from a potentiality, the 
potentiality presupposes another actuality, and so forth. A(actuality) comes from
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B(potentiality), B is in effect from C(another actuality), C is from D(another 
potentiality), and so on. So we cannot grasp what comes first. Therefore, at this 
stage, Aristotle presupposes "the existence of a first mover which already exists 
'actually'" (1049b25-26). And so he is able to claim the priority of actuality. 
Thirdly, it is prior in substantiality. Aristotle explains that it is because a puppy 
which is posterior in becoming is prior to matter in form and in substantiality. For 
matter comes to have the form of a puppy which already is although the puppy itself 
comes into existence later than the potentiality. And the matter that come to be 
moves towards the form, namely, an end. Thus, Aristotle defines that actuality is an 
end. And actuality is identified with form in the sense that form is the end toward 
which change is headed and from which it has come.
As we have seen, for Aristotle there are two kinds of potentialities which are 
contraries, such as health and illness, hot and cold, rest and motion and the like. 
However, Aristotle conceives that, since contraries cannot be present in a thing at 
the same time, actuality also cannot be in the two ways of contraries at the same 
time.
Everything of which we say that it can do something, is alike capable of contraries, e.g. that of 
which we say that it can be well is the same as that which can be ill. and has both potencies at 
once ... The capacity for contraries, then, is present at the same time: but contraries cannot be 
present at the same time, and the actualities also cannot be present at the same time. e.g. health 
and illness. Therefore, while the good must be one of them, the capacity is both alike, or neither: 
the actuality, then, is better. (Met. 1051a5-16).
Aristotle here assumes it follows that the [good] actuality is better than the [good] 
potentiality. He probably conceives that potentiality which comes into actuality is 
less than the whole potentiality, since the potentiality is composed of the contraries, 
good and bad, whereas an actuality means a complete reality.
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Before going further to examine whether it is reasonable to believe in that actuality 
is the end which is always good, we should argue whether actuality implies no more 
change or whether it cannot play the role of potentiality for another actuality. For, 
if it is again a potentiality, it is also composed of the same amount of contraries, 
good and bad. Then, the good of the new actuality is presumably the same as that 
of the potentiality which becomes the actuality. For the same reason, the bad end 
or actuality cannot be claimed to be worse than its potentiality, as opposed to 
Aristotle's claim. And whatever changes has potentialities which are sources of 
change whether to act or to be acted on. Consequently, there seems no ground for 
Aristotle's claim that potentiality is that which is always moving towards good, nor 
is there any ground for saying that only the bad is incapable of being actualised.
Given the analysis of the notion of potentiality, let us now turn to Aristotle's 
attempt to expound the problem of the one and the many with the notion. At the 
end of the Physics 1.2, Aristotle implies that the problem may be answered thus: a 
thing may be potentially [many] and actually [one] (Phy. 186a6). This passage 
seems to indicate that when a man is capable of playing music or of building a house 
he can be called a musician or a house-builder, and therefore he is said to be 
potentially many although he is actually one. There seems no flaw in this argument. 
However, this was, in effect, the stage where Aristotle endeavoured to settle the 
problem of how many beings can come from a definite number of principles. 
Therefore, it is plain that the passage is not the answer to the problem, for the 
problem is about the real beings which are present at the moment, not the potential 
beings, e.g. a man's capability of becoming this at one time and that at another time. 
As we observe, the number of a man is not more or less than one even if he is called 
by diverse names in accordance with his capabilities or potentialities. When we 
examine Aristotle's expounding the priority of the actuality to the potentiality it 
becomes clear that the distinction between actuality and potentiality hardly seems to 
be any solution for the problem. As we have seen, Aristotle believes that actuality 
is prior to potentiality in formula, in time, and in substantiality. In particular, in his
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explication of its priority in time he clearly states that actually existing is always 
produced by an actually existing thing from a potentially existing one. That is, there 
cannot be any potential beings which do not presuppose actual beings. Then, it 
follows that all beings which come to existence are from the beings which have 
already existed. Therefore, many beings are from many beings, not from a definite 
number of beings. Thus, the problem of the one and the many hardly seems to be 
solved with the distinction between actuality and potentiality.
On the other hand, in 1.8 in the Physics, Aristotle explicitly states that one of the 
solutions for the problem of what is coming from what is or from what is not might 
be the distinction.
We have presented one solution of the difficulty raised by our predecessors: but there is another 
solution. The same terms may be analyzed with the aid of the distinction between the potential 
and the actual: [a product comes from what "is not" that product actually but from what "is" that 
product potentially], (191b24-29).
The example that Aristotle takes for what is coming from what is not is a doctor's 
building a house, turning white, and healing a patient. A doctor does not build a 
house as a doctor, but as a house-builder, nor does he turn white in so far as he is a 
doctor, but in so far as he is dark. On the other hand, his healing a patient is as a 
doctor, not as a patient. Aristotle distinguishes the former two examples from the 
last and thinks the former are proper examples of the problem of what is coming 
from what is not. To say that what is comes from what is not seems to mean that 
what is comes from what is not in so far as what is not is not mere what is not, that 
is, what is not is potentiality which is capable of being actualised. For example, a 
doctor's healing a patient is the capability which he has actually, but his building a 
house is that which he does not have actually.
One might raise the question why, then, it is impossible for him to be white in so 
| far as he is a doctor. The answer might be again, I think, that what is not is not a
i
i
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mere privation, but has a potentiality which is capable of something. His emphasis 
is the capability of potentiality. Not anything can come from anything, but 
something can come from something which is capable of becoming that very 
something.
The problem of what is coming from what is might be answered far more easily. 
We say that what is comes from what is when, for example, a particular animal 
comes from a particular animal, namely, a dog comes from a dog, but not from any 
kind of animal. Aristotle continues to say,
It will not come from what is any more than it will come from what is-not (namely, as we have 
said, in so far as the latter is-not). (Phy. 191b23-24)
In effect, this problem is already examined when we discussed the priority of 
actuality in time. That is, a puppy comes from matter which is actually in an 
actuality, a dog, but which is potentiality since it is not yet a puppy. Therefore, it 
might be concluded that a puppy that is an actually existing or what is comes from a 
dog that is an actually existing or what is. Thus, as we have so far seen, it is 
obvious that, although Aristotle attempts to settle many problems with the 
distinction between actuality and potentiality, these problems are not sufficiently 
solved.
To sum up: in this chapter we have so far focused on the possibility o f change in 
terms of privation and potentiality. We have defined the notion of privation as a 
mere empty space which is still not capable of changing but which designates a 
possibility in another sense; that is, it is a pre-condition for change. Since an empty 
space or a mere possibility is not sufficient for there to be change we have expected 
from the notion of potentiality the role of enabling the possible change to be actual. 
However, although Aristotle defines change as the actualisation of potentiality we 
are still not entitled to claim to have discovered what makes the potentiality be
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actualised. Accordingly, we are to pertinently endeavour to find out the real source 
of change in the rest of our examination later on.
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C hapter IV
N ature, aitia, and Chance
How can there be change of natural substances? What are the conditions for the 
change? These questions are what we have endeavoured to answer and we might 
be now entitled to claim the possibility of change by adopting Aristotle’s notions, 
such as privation and potentiality, that have been so far examined. These notions 
are inner principles that make beings capable of changing rather than external 
factors that cause change. .And it is undeniable that Aristotle is indeed more 
interested in inner causes than in external causes.
In the Physics II. 1, by distinguishing things that exist by nature from those that 
exist by other causes Aristotle briefly presents the distinction between things which 
have in themselves a source of movement or rest and things which do not. That is, 
he thinks that there are two types of beings in nature, natural beings and artefacts, 
and that the change of natural beings is due to their nature. Therefore, it might be 
worthwhile to enquire into the question on what grounds Aristotle claims that only 
natural beings are able to change by themselves and what are the characteristics of 
nature by examining his distinction between natural beings and artefacts.
Aristotle's other interest in relation to the notion of nature is whether there is any 
other factor that causes change. He introduces the four causes or explanatory 
factors, the formal, the material, the efficient, and the final. Thus, in the second 
section of chapter IV we shall consider the status or role o f the four aitiai in 
change. And, the next question that Aristotle enquire into is whether there is any 
event which is unexpected, that is, which occurs by chance. Obviously, if it is 
proved that there are events occurring by chance, Aristotle's whole theory of change 
might lose the ground on which it is based. For since, as we have seen, Aristotle
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conceives that for a thing to change there must be a privation in it and the 
potentiality of acting, if there is any chance event, it might seem that, even though 
there were no privation and potentiality, there might still be the possibility of 
change.
IV. 1 The Characteristics of Nature
For Aristotle, the fact that there is nature in some beings is obvious, and need not 
be proved (Phy. 193a4-5). And the characteristics of such a nature must be that of 
being a cause since it is compared with other ’’causes". From Aristotle's belief that 
natural substances have "in themselves" tendencies to change, it might well be 
assumed that it is an internal principle rather than external. By contrast, it seems 
clear that other causes are external, for if artefacts do not have in themselves such 
tendencies they require a certain cause from outside for there to be change. It is 
also true that apart from the controversial question whether there is any change 
without direct contact they seem to require to some extent direct and contagious 
forces to cause change.
Among beings, some are formed by nature, some by other causes. Among those formed by nature, 
we may name animals and their parts, plants, and the simple bodies (earth, fire. air. and water): 
all of these, together with beings like them, we call "formed by nature." Observation discloses 
how they differ from things not constituted by nature: each of them has within itself a beginning of 
movement and rest, whether the "movement" [or specific type of behaviour] is a local motion, 
growth or decline, or a qualitative change. Such is not the case with things like beds and clothes: 
that is to say. to the extent that these come within the classification of "products of art", they do 
not have implanted within themselves any tendency to change; nevertheless, in so far as they 
happen to consist of stone or earth or a composite material, they do have such a beginning of 
movement and rest, but only in this respect. (Phv. 192b8-22)
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In the passage above, Aristotle divides beings in nature into two types, natural 
substances which have tendencies to change and artefacts which do not; that is to 
say, the criterion of Aristotle's distinction between the two types of beings, between 
natural substances and artefacts, is whether they possess a nature to change or not, 
or whether they are formed by nature or by other causes.
At this stage, one might raise the question whether Aristotle wishes to say that 
artefacts do not change at all if they have no tendencies to change. In the passage 
quoted above, he shows that if they are composed of the simple bodies, such as 
water, earth, and so on, they do have these tendencies. In effect, the statement 
"artefacts which do not have implanted within themselves any tendency to change 
are able to change in so far as they consist of stone or earth or a composite 
material" seems vacuous since it is hardly plausible to say that there is an artefact 
which is not composed of any of them. Therefore, if what Aristotle implies is 
merely that artefacts which are not composed of any of the simple bodies do not 
have within themselves tendencies to change, then it follows that all artefacts have 
these tendencies. That is, it is absurd to say that, for example, if a bed made of 
wood remains without being affected by other external forces, it will permanently be 
without any change. It is plain that, even though not caused by any of the forces, 
the bed will become rotten as time passes. Thus, to some extent artefacts seem to 
have a nature to change.
One might be also curious to what extent wood can be said to be that which is not 
transformed into anything and persists through change since Aristotle maintains that 
wood, bronze, earth, and so forth are the nature of a subject for they remain 
continuously through its changing conditions (Phy. 193a 17-23). A bed also to 
some extent persists through change; e.g. a bed here at one time is there at another 
time. Conversely, when wood is burnt, it becomes charcoal w'hich is no longer 
called wood. And therefore the difference between wood and a bed seems only to 
be that w'ood is likely to last for a longer period of time than the bed. Nonetheless,
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there might be no objection to saying that some matter that persists through change 
seems to have a nature (Phy. 193a28-30). For in changing there should be
something in which a nature consists. However, the example of a wooden bed 
raises the question whether the nature is of an artefact (a bed) or of matter (wood). 
We shall discuss this point later on.
As we have examined in the previous chapter on an argument on the notion of
potentiality, Aristotle has no doubt that everything in nature, whether it has a soul 
or not, has both the potentiality of acting and of being acted on. It is plain that the 
potentiality of being acted on is common to all beings since whatever changes 
[moves] is changed [moved] by something else or by itself qua other (Phy. VIII 3). 
For if they did not have this potentiality, then they would not be capable of acting. 
However, although .Aristotle does also claim that the potentiality of acting is in 
everything, he seems to hesitate to claim that it plays the same role in natural
substances and artefacts. It is obvious that the artefacts, too, have the potentiality
of changing others, but conditionally, not absolutely; they do not change others 
spontaneously, but do only when they are changed by something else for they lack 
the tendency to change (192b 19). For example, an arrow does not change
spontaneously as such. But it causes a bird to fly when it is fired by a man. In this
sense, since it does not have in itself any tendency to move spontaneously the arrow 
is capable of changing others only when it is moved by an external force, namely, a 
man's shooting using a bow. Aristotle says elsewhere,
... of the things which are moved essentially, some are moved by themselves, whereas others are 
moved by something else: and some are moved naturally whereas others are moved "contrary to 
nature" or violently. (254bl4-17)
It is plain that he means artefacts by 'others'. Then, the suggestion of this passage is 
that artefacts not moving spontaneously is their nature, whereas the nature of the 
other substances, so-called natural substances, is to move spontaneously. Again,
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that artefacts being moved is 'contrary' to nature' does not mean that they do not 
have nature at all, but indicates that they do not have the nature to be moved. Thus, 
we may conclude that what artefacts do not have is the nature to change 
spontaneously but they have the nature to change conditionally or to be changed. 
To sum up, a question of how an arrow that does not possess a nature to change 
enables a bird to fly might be easily answered; that is, the arrow has a nature "to 
change non-spontaneously", but has a nature to change when it is caused to do so 
by an external force. However, there still remains the same question, as it appeared 
in an earlier stage, whether the nature to change 'non-spontaneously' is of artefacts 
or of the matter which constitute the arrow.
Let us now turn to the question whose nature it is in an example of a bed being 
rotten. Aristotle answers that a bed being rotten is the nature of wood {Phy. 
193al 0-31) rather than that of a bed (See 192b2-22).
Now. some hold that the nature or the primary being of natural beings is their proximate 
constituent by itself, apart from any arrangement of it: the nature of a bed. they say, is wood and. 
of a statue, bronze. As Antiphon suggests, by way of giving a clue to this interpretation: bun a 
bed and let it rot until it gets enough power to send forth a shoot, this shoot would not be a bed but 
wood.: hence, the bed's arrangement by convention and by art is only incidental to it. whereas.its 
primary being is what remains continuously through its changing conditions!... This is the reason 
why some declare earth, others fire or air or water, and still others some or all of these elements, to 
be the nature of beings. (193a 10-24)
One might be curious how far it is possible for us to discriminate matter, wood, 
from an artefact, a bed, and why a bed lacks a nature? If the criterion of the 
distinction between natural substances and artefacts is that the former are organic 
unities whereas the latter are not, does he mean that wood is an organic unity? To 
say that a bed being rotten is the nature of wood rather than that of bed is because
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"the bed is an artefact, the wood not".21 That is, wood being rotten is, as we shall 
see later on, due to its being an organic unity derived from its essence. It seems to 
follow that for a substance to be said to have essence no form or whatsoever should 
be given to matter; that is, a substance which is composed of form and matter 
should remain as such without being made, or without being artificial. However, 
since the form of a bed is imposed on matter, e.g. wood, by a craftsman Aristotle 
would say that the bed cannot have any essence at all. For essence is not that which 
is given to a being, but that which is always present in the thing. Then, it follows 
that the essence which seems to belong to an artefact is the essence of the matter of 
the artefact rather than that of the artefact itself.22 Thus, it might be concluded that 
artefacts themselves do not strictly change at all and that their seeming change is in 
effect the change of the matter which constitutes the artefact. For artefacts do not 
have any essence. All the same, what persists is from the nature of matter, not from 
the nature of an artefact. For, as mentioned, there cannot be any change without 
presupposing matter. Thus, Aristotle says that some matter that persists through 
change seems to have a nature (Phy. 193a28-30). For there should be something in 
which a nature consists. Let us sum up our position reached so far in Aristotle's 
own remarks.
'Nature' means the primary material of which any natural object consists or out of which it is 
made, which is relatively unshaped and cannot be changed from its own potency, as e.g. bronze is 
said to be the nature of a statue and of bronze utensils, and wood the nature of wooden things: and 
so in all other cases: for when a product is made out of these materials, the first matter is preserv ed 
throughout.... 'Nature' means the essence of natural objects, as with those who say the nature is 
the primary mode of composition ... Hence as regards the things that are or come to be by nature.
21 Waterlow. op.cit.. p. 55.
: :Although. at this stage, it seems to be said that the essence is of matter which constitutes an 
artefact the essence and the matter are not identified. For essence has two aspects, matter and 
form as nature does. Further discussion on this point will be done in chapter V .l.
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though that from which they naturally come to be or are is already present, we say they have not 
their nature yet, unless they have their form or shape. (Alet. 1014b27-1015a5)
In the passage above, Aristotle shows that for a thing to be said to be formed by 
nature it should have form as well as matter. He says in the Physics that nature is 
called form more appropriately than material (193b8-9). If Aristotle's usage of the 
word "nature" implies, as we have seen, "non-artificial", then the nature in a thing 
must mean essence: to have whatever it has to have. He expounds here again the 
view that the difference between natural substances and artefacts is that the former 
are capable of generating the same genus as themselves, whereas the latter are not. 
For example, man generates man, whereas a bed is not produced by a bed.
How can, then, natural substances have such internal tendencies, while artefacts do 
not? Aristotle's answer seems to be that the nature of natural substances to change 
is due to their essence. In other words, their nature comes from their essence.
'Nature' means ... The source from which the primary movement in each natural object is present 
in it in virtue of its own essence. ... Organic unity differs from contact: for in the latter case there 
need not be anything besides the contact, but in organic unities there is something identical in both 
parts, which makes them grow together instead of merely touching, and be one in respect of 
continuity and quantity, though not of quality. (Alet. 1014bl9-26)
There might be diverse explanations of a man's shooting an arrow; because he 
wants to catch a bird, or because he was simply bored, or the like. However, any of 
them hardly seem to show the immediate source of his capability to take such an 
action. It is therefore probable that Aristotle reaches the conclusion that natural 
substances have within themselves tendencies to change because they are organic 
unities, which in turn is derived from their essence. As we shall closely see in the 
final chapter, essence is defined as what it is for a thing to be. Therefore, the nature 
to change which natural substances have is that which they possess essentially, not
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that which is attained at some point in their existence. In brief, from the 
examination so far it thus seems clear that Aristotle connects nature with essence 
and therefore the nature of natural substances can be said to be their attaining the 
final form that they are to be. To sum up, for Aristotle nature has two meanings, 
form and matter (Phy. 194al3-15); nature is an actual being as well as a potential 
being since matter is a potentiality to be actualised as a form, an actuality.
...the matter is called the nature because it is qualified to receive this, and processes of becoming 
and growing are called nature because they are movements proceeding from this. And nature in 
this sense is the source of the movement of natural objects, being present in them somehow , either 
potentially or in complete reality. (Met. 1015a 15-19)
In concluding the argument on the characteristics of nature as it stands, there might 
be two questions that one might enquire into: (1) if nature is to complete what it is 
for a thing to be, how can, then, he answer to the happenings, such as a deformed 
baby being bom or unexpected mutation? (2) is there any difference between nature 
and essence or do they have the same characteristics? The answers might be 
expected respectively (1) in analysing Aristotle's thesis on chance events in chapter 
IV.3 and (2) Aristotle's theory’ of'for the sake of something' in chapter V. 1.
IV.2 The Four Types of aitia
It is hardly plausible to say that in two different languages there are two words 
whose meanings are exactly matched to each other. And therefore in translating the 
Greek word aition or aitia into English many commentators show different 
opinions. Most commentators such as Guthrie, Ross, and Irwin translate it as 
cause, Hope and Taylor as explanation or explanatory factors, and Lear as fashion. 
Using the term 'cause' is a direct translation from the Greek word and the choice of
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the term 'explanation' seems to entirely depend on Aristotle's statement that his aim 
for the argument on the aitia is to attain knowledge why a thing changes in such- 
and-such a way (Phy. 194b20-22) or why change happens to a thing. On the other 
hand, Lear's terminology 'fashion' seems to be a different point of view from other 
commentators. He says that "what he [Aristotle] actually cites are not four causes 
but four fashions in which we cite the cause".23 His usage of the word seems to be 
merely another expression of 'explanation' but to show the limitation of our 
linguistic expression. Although it is undeniable that all the commentators 
endeavour to find the most adequate word which transmits the exact meaning of the 
Greek word without losing the original meaning, none of them seem successful. 
Probably, the best way to avoid that kind of a problem might be of course to use 
the Greek word as it is used. But it does not seem to be an absolute solution for the 
problem since the meaning of the word might also be equivocal. The main reason 
for this problem occurring is that Aristotle begins his argument on aitia with saying 
that his aim is to know the 'why' o f change.
There is obviously a difference between describing a thing's changing and 
explaining the process of the change, or why it happens. That is to say, in a change 
there must be an unobservable factor as well as an observable one, whereas in 
explaining a change we are fundamentally to depend on our sensory perceptions to 
explain a change. It is therefore undeniable that in many cases the process of 
Aristotle's reasoning leaves us the problem of how it is possible for us to advance 
on such areas from our ordinary experience; the process from the experienceable 
facts to the inexperienceable.
Since Aristotle, nonetheless, attempts to cover or express both the areas with one 
word 'aitia' it is natural that we are confused by the word translated into English. 
Thus, although it is true to say that, as Ackrill says24, Aristotle's doctrine of the
23 J. Lear, Aristotle: the desire to understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). p. 
27.
24 J.L. Ackrill. Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981). p. 36.
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causes might better be called a doctrine of the four 'becauses' we are in effect 
required to use both the English words 'cause' and 'explanation' or 'explanatory 
factor' where it is appropriate in accordance with the context.
Bearing this point in mind, let us begin our argument with citing Aristotle's 
expounding the four types of the aiiia.
"An explanatory factor." then, means (1) from one point of view, the material constituent from 
which a thing comes; for example, the bronze of a statue, the silver of a cup, and their kinds. 
From another point of view. (2) the form or pattern of a thing, that is, the reason (and the kind of 
reason) which explains what it was to be that thing; for example, the factors in an octave are based 
on the ratio of tw o to one and. in general, on number. This kind of factor is found in the parts of a 
definition. Again. (3) the agent whereby a change or a state of rest is first produced; for example, 
an adviser is "responsible" for a plan, a father "causes" his child, and. in general, any maker 
"causes" what he makes, and any agent causes what it changes. Again. (4) the end or the where- 
for; so. when we take a walk for the sake of our health, and someone asks us why we are walking, 
we answer, "in order to be healthy." and thus we think we have explained our action. So any 
intermediate means to the end of a series of acts: for example, as means of health there are 
reducing, purging, drugs, instruments, and so forth; for all these are for an end. though they differ 
from one another in that some are instruments, and others are actions. (Phy. 194b24-195a3)
What Aristotle shows in this passage is that in explaining a thing's change, namely, 
an event, there are four types of explanatory factors, material, formal, efficient, and 
final factors. At first sight, for us who normally associate a cause with an effect, the 
efficient factor seems to be the most proper cause to explain a thing's change since 
for the other factors it is hard to see what are immediate factors to cause a change. 
For Aristotle, what is coming to be is from something which already exists and. if 
there is not anything, nothing can be produced {Met. 1032b30-31). Therefore, it is 
natural for him to assume that there already is at least matter before something is
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brought about, and this 'something' is present potentially in the matter. Thus, 
causes are related to something that exists.
At this stage, one might raise a question whether the four causes are applied to all 
beings, things formed by nature and those formed by other causes. To answer this 
question we have to examine whether the causes are external or internal. For if 
natural beings' capability to change is an inner principle of change, then the natural 
beings do not seem to require any external cause for their change. As we shall see 
at once, Aristotelian causes seem to be internal causes as well as external causes 
which designate Humean causes.
Aristotle's adopting the two explanatory factors, material and formal, is 
presumably derived from his analysis of nature. In an earlier stage, the claim has 
been examined that natural beings have in themselves natures to change, while 
artefacts do not. Nature which is an inner principle of change, and which 
presupposes a subject, has two aspects, form and matter. It is plain that, in order to 
explain why a thing changes in such-and-such a way, Aristotle first needs to say that 
the change is because a thing is composed of form and matter, which are two 
different aspects of nature, since he defines nature as a source of change. Again, a 
thing changes in such-and-such a way since it has a source of change. Thus, for 
Aristotle the formal and the material play the roles of explanatory factors rather 
than causes which directly cause beings to change since he says nature which has 
two aspects, form and matter, is innate in things.
Another sort of Aristotelian explanatory factor, the final, might be understood 
with reference to his assumption that, as we shall closely see in the next chapter, 
nature does nothing in vain and tends toward an end {Phy. 194a26-27) as well as 
toward what is best (195a25). Since the most characteristic mark of nature has 
been defined as the completion of a thing's being what it has to be it is plain that this 
also plays a role of an explanatory factor as an inner principle o f change. However, 
one thing we should note here is that Aristotle expounds the formal and the final as 
external causes by identifying the former with the latter (199a20-33). For example,
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when a sculptor produces a form of a statue for the aiming at producing the statue 
his forming as well as his aiming at are said to be explanatory factors. Ross says,
'Form' for Aristotle embraces a variety of meanings. Sometimes it is used of sensible shape, as
when the sculptor is said to impose a new form on his material The form is the plan of
structure considered as informing a particular product of nature or of art. The final explanatory 
factor25 is the same plan considered as not yet embodied in the particular thing but as aimed at by 
nature or of art.26
To assume the formal and the final explanatory as external is problematic for, if 
nature which is said to be a source of changing which natural substances have 
within themselves designates a source of changing spontaneously, they do not seem 
to require any external force to become what it is for a thing to be, but Aristotle 
does believe in that nature is not absolutely capable of doing so but sometimes
needs the assistance o f art, which may well be thought of an external force, to
become what it is for a thing to be. Aristotle says that the role of art is to complete
what nature is unable to carry to a finish (Phy. 199al2-29)
As examined in the previous section, Aristotle distinguishes natural substances 
from artefacts according to whether they are formed by nature or by other causes 
(192b8). If  the former are also changed by other causes which we have defined as 
external, then the distinction between the two types of things is no longer obvious. 
In other words, Aristotle has emphasised that things which are not affected by other 
causes are said to be formed by nature; that is to say, only such things are capable 
of changing spontaneously. And if this is true, why should natural substances 
require other causes? Certainly, without form and matter, no natural thing is 
capable o f coming into being. And also, without an end related to the two, that
25 I replace Ross' translation 'cause' with 'explanatory' factor' for the purpose of showing 
consistency in this work.
4 W.D. Ross. Aristotle London: Methuen and New' York: Barnes & Noble, 1964), p. 74.
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which comes to be would be random; for example, man would not always come 
from man but sometimes from dogs, or from horses, or the like. Thus, it is clear 
that the three factors so far examined are involved in natural beings and the beings 
need not require other external forces to become as they are. Therefore, we might 
conclude the formal and the final explanatory factors can be that which nature has 
as well as that which can be imposed on matter by external forces.
We are now in a position to examine the nature of the efficient factor. Although 
Ross claims that the final as well as the efficient are adequately expressed by 'cause' 
in English,27 the latter seems to be the better candidate for a cause for our present: 
purpose to discriminate a cause which is external and immediate from that which is 
not. Since, in the passage cited above concerning Aristotle's defining the four 
explanatory factors, the example of the efficient is a father's causing his child we 
naturally assume that Aristotelian efficient cause does not seem to be different from 
Humean causation which concerns a cause, a father, with an effect, his child, with 
reference to time, namely, the priority of a cause.28 However, Charlton points out 
this as a misunderstanding, caused by our being accustomed to the conception of 
Humean causation29. Charlton's ground for the claim is according to the following 
passage;
... the operating and individual causes exist and cease to exist simultaneously with their effect (for 
example, this man actually healing is correlative with this man who is now being healed, and this 
actual builder, with this thing-being-now-built); but potentially they do not exist together (for the 
house and the builder do not perish with the act of building). {Phy. 195b 15-22)
Charlton in particular pays attention to the phrase, "causes being simultaneous with 
their effects", which is contrasted with Humean causes that are prior to their effect.
27 Ibid., p. 73.
28 D. Hume, 'A Treatise Concerning Human Nature', A.J. Ayer and R. Wynch, British Empirical 
Philosophers (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p. 359.
29 W. Charlton, Aristotle's Physics I&II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 101.
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How can there be a cause and an effect at the same time? To answer this 
question, we are required to examine Aristotle’s usage of the two terms, cause and 
effect. As the passage cited above shows, Aristotle calls the potentiality of acting a 
cause and that of being acted on an effect. As analysed in an earlier discussion of 
the notion of potentiality, for Aristotle, for change to be possible the potentiality of 
acting and that of being acted on should be matched and they tend toward one and 
the same actualisation. And they are simultaneous, otherwise they will not meet 
each other and there is no possibility that they can be matched. It is, therefore, plain 
that "the actualising of the two potentialities is not two separate events but one and 
the same event".30
On the other hand, the potentiality of acting which Aristotle might call a cause is 
not a cause in the Humean sense. Aristotle in effect distinguishes the potential 
cause from the actual cause, merely capable of acting from actually in operation.
... any factor, whether essential or accidental, may be actually in operation or merely capable of 
acting: a house being built is the work of "builders." but more actually of the builder who is 
building it. (Phy. 195b5-8)
For Hume causation is invisible. He says that "the only one that can be traced 
beyond our senses... which we do not see or feel is causation".31 However, 
Aristotelian actual cause is that which is visible; that is, when a builder builds a 
house his activity of building is empirically observable.
In brief, summing up the differences between Aristotelian and Humean cause 
discussed so far might be helpful to grasp the characteristics of Aristotelian efficient 
cause. The differences are (1) that Aristotelian cause and its effect are 
simultaneous, whereas Humean cause is prior in time to its effect, (2) that 
Aristotelian cause and effect are one and the same event since both o f them move
30 Lear, op.cit., p. 32.
31 Hume in British Empirical Philosophers, p. 358.
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towards actualising one and the same event, whereas Humean cause and effect are 
two events since the connection called causation is, he thinks, derived from an idea 
of connecting two events, and (3) that for Aristotle the connection between causes 
and effects is visible, whereas Humean causation is invisible.
In consequence, among the four explanatory factors the formal, the matter, and 
the final factors are inner principles of change rather than external. And, the former 
two factors are respectively potentiality and actuality and the latter is actuality. On 
the other hand, the efficient factor involves potentiality as well as actuality. Except 
for the efficient factor the rest of them seem to be explanatory factors which explain 
why change happens rather than causes which brings about change. However, since 
the efficient factor is closely connected with the formal and the final factors, in 
order to determine whether the efficient factor is entitled to be called a cause which 
is external, we are indeed required to examine the relation between the other three 
factors. Thus, for this reason, although we have here treated Aristotelian four 
explanatory factors individually the relation between them should be examined. 
This task will be done in chapter V. 1 in an argument on Aristotle's conception of 
'for the sake of something".
IV.3 Chance Events
Given the fact that the four factors are applied to explain a thing's changing, 
Aristotle now goes on to consider whether there is any possibility of a thing's 
changing by chance or by luck; that is to say, he concentrates on analysing whether 
luck and chance are also explanatory factors for events other than the four factors 
analysed in the previous section.
It is obvious that we do not always observe all the causal chains of phenomena, 
and therefore we are sometimes not able to explain them properly. Nonetheless, it 
seems also plausible for Aristotle to say that it is always possible to find some
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explanation other than luck {Phy. 196a6-7) to describe why a change occurs. For, 
in many cases, even though we do not clearly see the precise and adequate 
explanatory factors for change, there are still observable phenomena in changing. 
Otherwise, we are not qualified to claim that there is change or that there seems no 
immediate cause of the event.
Before we begin our discussion on Aristotle's conceptions of chance and of luck, it 
is to be noted that Aristotle's main aim in analysing them is not to examine whether 
or not they are causes but how they are to be classified in relation to the four 
explanatory factors, the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final {Phy. 196b9- 
10). In effect, Aristotle does not seem to have any doubt that luck and chance are 
explanatory factors.
... chance and luck... Both belong to the type of "explanatory factors" whence comes the 
beginning of movement. They are always a sort of factor operating either by nature or by design, 
although the number of these is indeterminate. (198a 1-5)
The famous example of Aristotle's showing a chance event is a creditor's going to 
a market and, as a result, recovering a debt from his debtor.
Suppose, for example, that a creditor would have gone to a market to recover his loan had he 
known that his debtor was there, but he happened to go there for another purpose with the result 
that he got his money, although it was not his usual or invariable practice [as it might have been 
for someone else] to go to the place where the two men met: the result (getting the money) is. like 
any object of deliberate choice, a factor external to the agent; and w>e say that the event happened 
by luck [relatively to the normal case], for we would not say this if he had gone there regularly or 
normally for the purpose of soliciting funds. (196b34-197a6)
Since prediction is applied to things happening always or for the most part (197a 19) 
.Aristotle ascribes unpredictable results, or results which are different from
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expectation, to chance or to luck; that is, chance or lucky events are neither always 
nor for the most part. In order to grasp what Aristotle suggests in the passage 
above, it might be helpful to distinguish the following cases:
(1) A goes to a market with a purpose to look for B.
(2) A goes to a market with another purpose.
(3) Whenever A goes to a market, A meets B.
(4) Even if A always goes to a market, A has never met B. But this time A 
meets B.
(5) A who hardly goes to a market goes there and meets B.
Obviously, (3) is not called a chance event in Aristotle's terminology'. For Aristotle 
would not call an event happening always or for the most part a chance event. He 
says,
We observe that some events always occur in the same way and some usually so. Evidently, we do 
not ascribe either of these two classes of events to luck: nor do random events happen in the same 
way either necessarily and always or even for the most part... Evidently, then, there is such a 
thing as luck or chance... (Phy. 196b 10-18)
On the other hand, according to Aristotle's passage quoted above. (5) seems to be 
the most proper happening by chance or by luck since it meets the two conditions, 
neither always nor for the most part. However, it is to be noted that Aristotle tries 
to establish that chance events are in the sphere of things done with some purpose 
or end (196b30). Thus, (5) should be understood in connection with a purpose. 
And the purpose here means A's or B's "intention". That is to say, only if neither A 
nor B have any intention to meet each other does their seeing each other satisfy 
Aristotle's condition for a chance event. Hence, (2) and (5) together seem to 
constitute a chance event. Ackrill says,
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If you go to the market to buy food and happen to meet a man who owes you money - when to 
collect the debt was not your motive for going, and when the man is not a regular market-goer - 
that is your good luck.32
However, Ackrill does not point out other possibilities suggested by Aristotle's 
example. Suppose that, even though A knows that B must be in a market called C, 
A by mistake looks for B in a market D and meets B. What is this event called and 
by what cause can this be explained? It is undeniable that this event also seems to 
happen by chance or by luck for, even though A has expected to see B, B's being in 
a market D is in effect unpredictable. Therefore, it is not necessarily required that A 
must have another purpose other than the purpose to meet B. Aristotle, too, claims 
that luck or chance is unpredictable since "prediction applies to what is always or 
for the most part (197a 18-19)" but, by the same example, this claim might be 
denied. That is, even though the result of A's meeting B is aimed at by both it could 
still be called a chance or lucky event in the sense that it happens neither always nor 
for the most part. Thus, although Aristotle would say that (2) and (5) together are 
sufficient conditions for a chance event the condition (1) that A goes to a market 
with the very purpose to look for B might be also part of a chance event.
Let us now consider the case of (4). As mentioned, according to Ackrill's as well 
as Aristotle's passage, for a creditor's collection of his debt to be a chance event, he 
must not go to a market regularly. However, if A goes to a market regularly it need 
not make an event non-accidental, in so far as A does not always or for the most 
pan meet B in the market. Thus, if an event satisfies the conditions (1) or (2) and
(4) or (5) it deserves to be called a chance event.
Let us now examine how the potentialities of acting and of being acted on are 
applied to chance events. "It must be qualified by the explanation ," says Guthrie,
32. Ackrill, op.cit., p. 39.
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"that by chance we mean an incidental result from a regular chain of causation 
which was directed at some other end."33 Guthrie's interpretation of Aristotelian 
chance event here suggests that an event can be so called in so far as the result of 
the event is different from one's expectation or purpose, and in so far as the result is 
not regular, that is, in so far as the result occurs neither always or for the most part. 
It seems true to say that chance events have some causes. However, since an event 
appears different from "our expectation" we call it "a chance event". This point can 
be supported by Ross's statements that "chance is not an operative cause but only a 
name for a certain kind of connexion between events"34 or that "chance is simply a 
name for the unforeseen meeting of two chains of rigorous causation".35 These two 
statements suggest that chance is merely a description of an explanatory factor 
rather than a cause.
However, even if these two commentators' interpretation is correct for Aristotle's 
conception of chance Aristotle's account still does not seem to be successful in 
covering every possibility. For example, A who marries B gives birth to a baby C 
who is deformed. If nobody expects that C will be deformed, then C must be a 
chance event. Presumably. .Aristotle would say that one of the parents has the 
potentiality of acting and the other that of being acted on, and that one of them is 
the cause of begetting a deformed baby C. But suppose B has some disease 
discovered later on, which always causes him to produce a deformed baby, whereas 
A is normal. In other words, B's potentiality of acting might lead always or for the 
most pan to C but A's potentiality of being acted on does not normally lead to C. 
Or again, let us take the example of A's meeting B unexpectedly. Although A who 
knows that B will be in a market at 8 a.m. goes to the market to meet B on time, if 
B does not expect to meet A, their meeting is still a chance event from B's point of
33. W.K.C. Guthrie. A History- o f  Greek Philosophy Vol. VI. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1981). p. 240.
34. Ross, op.cit., p. 76.
35. Ibid.. p. 78.
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view, whereas it is not a chance event for A. In other words, questions can be 
raised about the extent to which the outcome is unexpected.
We have analysed Aristotelian chance events and reached the conclusion that 
.Aristotle's theory is not wholly adequate. To sum up: Aristotle would call it a 
chance event (1) that a result is different from one's expectation or purpose and (2) 
that the result occurs neither always nor for the most part. However, if chance is a 
description of an explanatory factor rather than a cause in its own right, (1) and (2) 
are not sufficient to define a chance event. For (a) there can be an event which is a 
chance event for A but which is not a chance event for B and (b) there can be an 
event which fits A's purpose and which does not seem to him a chance event but 
which is a chance event, say the result of a wrong decision, such as going to a 
market D thinking of it as a market C, and so on.
Thus, although Aristotle's theory of chance events need be supplemented 
Aristotle's claim that chance or luck is not a further kind of explanatory factor over 
and above the four explanatory factors discussed in the previous section seems 
plausible. The questions why A meets B in a market and why a deformed baby C is 
bom can be answered respectively because A goes to the market where B is there 
or the reverse and because one or both of C's parents has/have a defect. As 
emphasised in the previous section, there is obviously a difference between a thing's 
happening and to know why it happens, or to explain the process of change. Thus, 
it might be true that, if there were somebody who sees the mechanism of two 
events, there would be nothing happening by chance or luck.
Aristotle who expounds the theory of chance events goes on to argue, if chance 
events occur neither always nor for the most part, then what are the events that 
occur always or for the most part and how they can occur so. And this process of 
reasoning calls for the essence of beings in relation to Aristotelian teleology which 
we shall examine in the following chapter.
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C hapter V7
Aristotle’s Conception o f ’for the sake of something’ and N atural Agency
Before beginning our analysis of the Aristotelian conception of 'for the sake of 
something', it might be helpful to sum up our discussion so far in order to grasp the 
connection between the former issues and the issue which will be discussed here. 
We have mainly focused on the questions, such as (1) on what grounds Aristotle 
can claim that there is a possibility of change in nature, i.e. the problem of change 
coming from what-is or what-is-not, (2) where does change start from, i.e. the 
genesis of change, (3) what conditions there are for a thing to change, i.e. the 
notion of privation and potentiality, (4) what are the characteristics of nature which 
is said to be a source of change, and (5) whether that which changes is changed by 
something else or by itself.
It is also to be recalled that we have endeavoured to search for the sources of 
change according to Aristotle's course of reasoning as it appeared in the Physics. 
And, among the principles of change nature seems to be a better candidate for being 
called the source of change than the other principles, privation and potentiality, in 
the sense that it is, as we have examined in chapter IV. 1, some tendency to be a 
form of something which has within itself a beginning of movement (Phy. 193b4-5). 
In other words, nature is an immediate source of change, whereas the other 
principles are, if beings have no nature or are caused by art, a mere state o f change 
in beings which might remain without any change at all. It is in effect hard to 
describe the difference between nature and the other principles since the latter, too, 
are absolutely necessary for change to be possible. The difference might be 
explained in this way. Nature is 'a moving cause' which is capable o f bringing about 
change in so far as there is a subject which involves the other principles. On the
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other hand, even though a subject involves the other principles there cannot be any 
change unless it has a nature to move. Once again, nature is a principle of change 
or rest, whereas the others are only principles of rest.
However, it is still obscure where the nature of beings comes from. Indeed, this is 
a question about the source of nature, namely, the source of the source of change. 
It might be vacuous to say that some beings naturally have nature unless it is also 
answered how or from what they can have it.
Many difficulties remaining undiscovered, at this stage we are to search for the 
answer to the question of the source of change from Aristotle's conception o f 'for 
the sake o f something', namely, the final explanatory factor, which is in some cases 
identified with the formal and the efficient factor. For since we have examined 
Aristotle's diverse, and presumed, principles of change it might be, I believe, 
reasonable to take a backward step from the end of change in searching for the 
'real', or more immediate, source of change. In addition, since Aristotle identifies 
'for the sake of something' with the essence we shall pay considerable attention to 
defining the nature of it.
Our next discussion will be concentrated on examining what kinds of sources 
Aristotle conceives there are other than the sources which have discussed. In 
effect, as we shall see in the main discussion, he introduces as effecting change to 
some extent some other factors, e.g. desire or will, in the Metaphysics 1048a 14 
and, e.g. nutrition, sensation, thinking, and so on, throughout the De Anima. To 
grasp the proper sources of change in beings, we are required to examine the 
factors with reference to Aristotle's division of beings in nature. For, if he only 
divides beings, as he does in the Physics II. 1, into two types, i.e. natural beings and 
artefacts, but does not further subdivide the former into smaller groups, such as 
humans, non-human animals, plants, and the like, he cannot help being reproved by 
some commentators, e.g. Waterlow,36 for regarding "all the natural substances as
36 Waterlow, op.cit.. p. 30.
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purposeful agents". Therefore, we shall mainly focus on the question whether he 
divides beings in nature and, if he does, how or with what criterion he does so 
should be questioned. For whether Aristotle can be defended or not against such a 
reproach wholly depends, I believe, on his division of beings in nature.
As it may well be noted, this is the last stage of our discussion as regards the 
problem of change and the questions which will be enquired into in this chapter are 
closely related to the other theses discussed in earlier chapters. Thus, although I 
will try not to duplicate the theories examined so far, some of them might be 
required to some extent to recapitulate our earlier discussion related to the 
questions raised here and to develop further ideas on the problem.
V. 1 Aristotle's conception of'for the sake of something'
It is a natural process of reasoning for human beings to assume that since there is a 
beginning of change there must be an end of it as well. They are two termini of 
change, from something to something else. And it is undeniable that the two 
notions, terminus a quo and terminus ad quern, are to be thought of with regard to 
the conception of change which necessarily presupposes a subject which persists 
throughout the change. Aristotle, who begins his analysis of change by examining 
the possibility of it, endeavours to expound, in particular, in the Physics II.8 the 
view that all natural processes as well as human activities are 'for the sake of 
something'.
... Hence, there must be among natural beings and products such as exist or come into existence to 
some end. Again, in any procedure which has an end. what comes first and what comes next are 
performed for that end. But as in human operations, so in natural processes; and as in processes, 
so in human operations (unless something interferes). Human operations are for an end, hence 
natural processes are so too. (Phv. 199a2-12)
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There might be two extreme theses about describing a thing's changing; (1) 
whatever changes changes by chance and (2) whatever changes changes for a 
purpose. The former does not seem quite plausible since, for example, my writing 
this chapter is not for nothing but for something, namely, I am writing this for the 
purpose of examining the validity of Aristotle's conception of finality and, say, for 
an MPhil degree. In other words, I have, at least, an intention to show in this 
chapter what a thing's changing is towards or if change is towards anything. Thus, 
the thesis that everything happens by chance is not valid since there are obvious 
examples which show intended actions directed to a purpose.
How far, then, is it plausible to claim that everything moves towards an end0 
Nature for Aristotle does nothing without a purpose (Cael. 271 a33). In other 
words, as shown in the passage cited above, he seems to believe that all the events 
in nature happen for some end or purpose or for the sake of something. AJthough it 
is true that, as Gotthelf points out,37 "Aristotle nowhere clearly states the definition 
o f what it is to be (or come to be) 'for the sake of something'" it seems still possible 
for us to attempt to find what is it that a thing moves towards from Aristotle's 
remarks on this point in the Physics II.2 and 8.
... it is evident that there is such a factor [as an "end"] in natural processes and beings. Further, 
since "nature" is double, meaning either "material" or "form", and the latter is the end. everything 
else being for the sake of the end. the "form" will be the For What aimed at. (Phv. 199a29-33. see 
also 194a27-31)
Aristotle here shows he is identifying the final with the formal explanatory factor. 
Furthermore, in the Physics II. 7 he mentions that among the four explanatory
37A. Gotthelf, 'Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality', in A. Gotthelf and J.G. Lennox (eds.) 
Philosophical Issues in Aristotle' Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). pp. 
204-205.
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factors, the formal, the material, the efficient, and the final, the three other than the 
material are reduced to one individual substance.
Often the three factors coincide. "What" something is and "to what end" it is. may be the same; 
and a prime mover may be identical with these factors in form or species, since man generates 
man, and so with moved movers generally. (198a25-28)
Thus, in defining Aristotle's conception of 'for the sake of something' it might be a 
reasonable start to approach the conception by examining the relation among the 
three factors; that is, in what sense they are reducible to one.
Let us question by citing again Aristotle's definition of the four factors in what 
sense the formal, the efficient, and the final may coincide.
'Cause' means (1) that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into being, e.g. the 
bronze is the cause of the statue and the silver of the saucer, and so are the classes which include 
these. (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the definition of the essence, and the classes which include 
this... and the pans included in the definition. (3) That from which the change or the resting from 
change first begins; e.g. the adviser is a cause of the action, and the father a cause of the child, and 
in general the maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing. (4) 
The end, i.e. for the sake of which a thing is; e.g. health is the cause of walking. For 'why does 
one w-alk?' we say; 'that one may be healthy'; and in speaking thus we think we have given the 
cause. (Met. 1013a27-35)38
Why the material factor should be excluded from being identified with the other 
three factors might be found from the distinction between form and matter which 
we have endeavoured to define in chapter III. 1 and, partially, in chapter IV.2 in the 
discussion of the four factors. Material substances are composed of form and
38 This passage is duplicated in the Physics 194b25-195a 3.
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matter. This distinction does not seem to be so difficult in so far as we are capable 
of separating matter from form in our thought. That is, it is true that, as Aristotle 
notices (Phy. 193b6), the form of a substance which is the compound of matter and 
form is not actually separable from its matter. They are distinguished only by a 
process of our mental analysis. Nonetheless, to explain a substance's changing in 
terms of the Aristotelian material factor, we are to differentiate the form from the 
matter, and the reverse. Therefore, Aristotle says that matter is potentiality and 
form actuality (De An. 412al0, Met. 1050al6-17) for matter might come to attain 
its form {Mel. 1050al 5-17). Even though this clause is construed as saying that 
matter which has a certain form might reach another form there seems, at this stage, 
to be an obstacle to understanding it as, although it is untrue, matter which does not 
originally have any form at all comes to have a certain form. In brief, according to 
Geach's terminology,39 the matter might be defined as what the compound is formed 
from and the form as what makes what a thing is made of into that thing. Thus, 
they are two factors which constitute a substance but are not to be identified with 
each other.
Let us now turn to our main discussion of the relation among the three factors, the 
formal, the efficient, and the final, which are, according to Aristotle, identified with 
one another. Firstly, as for the formal factor, to say the form is the definition of the 
essence is construed that a man, for example, should be such by definition; that is, a 
man is called a man when he is perfect. In other words, it may well be said that a 
man, who has two hands and feet, a face with two eyes and a nose with two 
nostrils, and the like, deserves to be so called. One might raise the question 
whether Aristotle wishes to suggest that a man who has only one hand, namely, 
who is defective [or who is not perfect], is no longer a man. This is indeed a 
question of what is the essence of a man; that is, what makes a man a man. 
Suppose a man's arm was cut off in an accident. Do we call the arm a man? We
39 Anscombe, in G.E.M. Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Three Philosophers (Oxford: Blackwell. 
1961), p. 49.
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might be inclined to call it a cut arm or a human arm rather than a human. But if the 
rest of the man's body is still to be called a man, then it shows that a man's having 
two arms is not part of the essence of human. Thus, what is to be questioned here 
is what characteristics make up the essence of a man.
Let us take once again the example of man's generating man. Although it is true 
that Aristotle regards the generating in general as part of the essence of man he 
does not seem to conceive of man's generating males or man's generating females as 
acts involving different essences. In other words, the fact that man is capable of 
generating man, whether it is a male or a female, might be part of the essence but 
man's generating a male or a female is not part of the essence in the sense that it is 
not the case that man always generates males or always females. Indeed, generating 
a male or a female happens at random. Then, this seems to be a property of 
attributes rather than of essences since attributes are defined as something which 
may or may not be involved in a subject. In other words, not all predicates of a 
thing are part of the essence. In that sense, Anscombe points out that, according to 
the Aristotelian conception of essence, all the characteristics which constitute a 
thing are not part of its essence. She says,
Now it is true that Aristotle explains the accidental as the non-necessary, and that predicates 
belonging to the 'what it is to be that' of a thing are necessary; but that does not justify us in 
identifying the latter with necessary predicates; for he does not hold that all necessary predicates 
enter into the definition. This would be suggested by the identification of the accidental with the 
non-essential 40
When a sperm of a human meets a womb of a human it becomes a new human 
since, Aristotle would put it, the essence of the two is to be human. Here, I do not 
intend to question which of them gives matter and which of them form. However,
40 Anscombe, op.cit., p. 35.
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it is clear that a human cannot be completed only by one of them. Thus, both are 
necessary factors to be a human. It is undeniable that all the formal factors and the 
essence of natural beings are discovered after we observe what happens under 
certain circumstances in the sense that, unless we do observe, we will never be able 
to discern essences from attributes, although the essence is that which already is in 
the beings without reference to our observation. In other words, what we conceive 
of as man's generating a human essence is that which we can find out from many 
events of human procreation which happen always or for the most part and, 
presumably, in the same way; that is to say, if a human essence has been created it 
should be "always or for the most part" the case that man generates man. Thus, it 
seems worthwhile to apply to the notion of essence the two phrases, always and for 
the most part, which are opposed to the characteristics of Aristotelian chance 
events.
However, apart from our ability to observe the essences of things, the difficulty 
remaining here is that there is still some possibility that a thing has some other part 
of the essence which is not known to us. Therefore, since it is true that, as 
Anscombe states, not all predicates are involved in defining a thing it is undeniable 
that knowing all the predicates which describe a thing is not sufficient for us to 
know its essence. One has to select amongst the properties. The same difficulty 
might appear when an object is observed since a selection must be made from its 
observable properties; that is, if something happens only sometimes, we are not able 
to ascribe it to part of the essence of a thing. But, although it is not an absolute 
answer to the search for essence it is reasonable for Aristotle to suggest that we 
restrict ourselves to something known or present in objects in searching for 
essences.
The object of the inquiry is most easily overlooked where one term is not expressly predicated of 
another (e.g. when we inquire 'what man is'), because we do not distinguish and do not say 
definitely that certain elements make up a certain whole. But we must articulate our meaning
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before we begin to inquire; ... Since we must have the existence of the thing as something given, 
clearly the question is why the matter is some definite thing; e.g. why are these materials a house? 
Because that which was the essence of a house is present. ... {Met. VII. 17)
As we have so far discussed, it is reasonable to presume that Aristotle's conception 
of the form as an explanatory factor is of a thing's completing what it meant for a 
thing to be by definition (Phy. 198b8). Again, the formal factor is that a thing 
becomes what it is to be derived from its essence.
Let us sum up our discussion so far. The essence is something that is in 
substances, and it is said to be what it is for a thing to be of that sort. However, the 
properties observed might or might not be an essential part of the thing. 
Conversely, since the essence of a thing does not depend on our observation there 
might be part of the essence of the thing which we do not observe and do not know. 
Apart from many difficulties raised above in searching for the real essence of 
substances, it seems plausible to say that the formal factor is identified with the 
essence 'by definition'.
Given the characteristics of the formal factor, let us now analyse the final factor. 
As stated, the final is defined as the end or the where-for {Phy. 194b33). Aristotle 
elsewhere says,
... everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end (for that for the sake of 
which a thing is. is its principle, and the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is 
the end. and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired. For animals do not see in order 
that they may have sight, but they may have sight, but they have sight that they may see. {Met. 
1050a6-12)
It is to be recalled that Aristotle constantly maintains that the substance or form is 
actuality which is present in the agents, e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject 
(1050a30-b6). And also, there is no product apart from actuality (1050a35). As
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we have closely analysed in the discussion of the notion of potentiality, the priority 
of actuality to potentiality is mainly based on Aristotle's thought that coming to be 
is not from what-is-not absolutely but from something which persists through 
change, that is, he supposes a subject which has existed and which will continue to 
exist. In the example of man's generating man, namely, in a substantial change, we 
do not expect that Aristotle's answer to the question of what is it that persists would 
be that it is the man who already is. At this stage, one might be curious in what 
sense, then, the former man who already is and the latter man who is generated later 
on, namely, the end, are said to be identified. This is again a question about the 
essence of man, as enquired into in examining the characteristics of the formal 
factor. In the passage of the Metaphysics quoted above, Aristotle assumes that the 
end is also actuality as the is form. That is to say, the form of a human, namely, 
actuality, is the end which a new human will finally attain. For anything to come to 
be, there must already exist a perfect example to be its actuality'41 since, as we have 
analysed in the discussion of the notion of potentiality, for Aristotle actuality is prior 
to potentiality.
All the same, to say that the formal factor identified with the essence, and again 
with the final cause, is to be identified with the efficient cause should be understood 
this way. Aristotle defines the efficient factor as "the agent whereby a change or a 
state of rest is first produced {Phy. 194b29-30)" and conceives of a father as 
’causing’ his child. That is, when a human generates a new human the latter is 
different from the former; that is, it is absurd to say that my father and I, for 
example, are the same. However, the two are the same in the sense that they have 
the same form of human and that they fall under the same species, namely, human. 
Thus, what Aristotle means by the conception of ’for the sake something’ is to attain 
the form of what a thing is to be.
41 Guthrie, op.cit., p. 225.
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As it may well be noted, in this section we have mainly concentrated on the three 
factors in terms only of the generation of natural agencies, but not of artificial 
things. However, for a proper gasp of the notion of essence it might be helpful to 
examine briefly the essence of artefacts, too. Aristotle relates "shape" or "form" to 
"nature" (193a31) and explains that man's generating man is according to man's 
nature (193b9). It might not be difficult to understand that man's forming the final 
shape is from the essence of man. However, when this is applied to artefacts it is 
more complicated. For, when there is a chair made of wood by a craftsman, we 
should determine whether the essence is of wood or of a craftsman. At first sight, 
since Aristotle often shows that the efficient factor of artefacts which is identified 
with the formal factor, again with the essence, is the mind of a craftsman his answer 
to this enquiry seems obvious that the essence is of a craftsman. For artefacts do 
not have within themselves a beginning of movement (193b4) which signifies the 
capability of forming what it is for a thing to be. But producing an artefact is not a 
matter of the relation between a craftsman and an artefact, but between a craftsman 
and a material. Thus, it is worthwhile to enquire into why the essence is of a 
craftsman. It is undeniable that, when the chair is completed by a craftsman, the 
form is the final cause of the chair. It is not the case that a chair comes into 
existence from a chair, but from wood or from a craftsman. And since the form 
identified with the essence is also identified with the nature which is a source of 
movement that natural beings have within themselves a chair which does not have 
such a nature cannot have essence. But it is still hard to understand why the 
essence is the essence of a craftsman. A problem arising here is, as opposed to the 
definition of Aristotelian essence, that a craftsman's producing a chair does not 
always happen, namely, he produces a chair, a bed, a wardrobe, and so on, and that 
wood is not only matter of a chair but of diverse artefacts. It might be argued that 
wood being produced as certain artefacts might be an essence o f wood and 
craftsmen making artefacts the essence of craftsmen. However, wood being this 
particular chair or a craftsman's making this particular chair hardly seems to be from
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any of their essence. Thus, whether or not the essence is said to be of wood or of a 
craftsman, an artefact's being produced seems indeed to be an attribute rather than 
an essence.
Although we have seen that the three factors, the formal, the efficient, and the 
final, which explain why there is change in a thing are identified with one another in 
terms of the essence it should be noted that, as Martin points out, they are not 
exactly the same.
The form should not be confused with the essence. The essence is what the definition defines: so 
since the definition of a human being includes his or her being a material thing, the essence will 
include matter. The substantial form, which is introduced precisely in terms of that which makes 
a lump of matter to be a thing of a certain kind, does not. 42
In an earlier stage of this section V .l, we have seen that the form and the matter of 
a thing cannot be actually separated. Thus, if the essence of a thing is defined as 
'the what-it-is-to-be-that-thing'43 for a thing to be as such it should include matter as 
well as form since a thing is composed of matter and form. That is to say, in the 
definition of a thing to be what it is there are form and matter. This seems to follow 
that the notion of essence is identified with nature in the sense that both of them 
have two meanings, matter and form (Phy 193a30-b41). However, they are 
differentiated in the sense that the former designates a state of stasis, whereas the 
latter designates a state of movement and of rest. In other words, the essence is 
expressed by predicates of beings which the beings should have in order to become 
what they are to be. However, it does not follow that in the essence there is any 
power of completion. Aristotle seems to conceive that the essence is not something 
that can be attained but something that is always present in the beings. However,
42 Martin, op.cit., p. 69.
43 Guthrie, op.cit., p. 147.
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he nowhere in the Metaphysics discusses whether there is any power in the essence 
itself.
... in one sense the 'being' meani is 'what a thing is' or a 'this', and in another sense it means a 
quality of quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are. ... Now there are 
several senses in which a thing is said to be first; ... (1) in definition also this is first; for in the 
definition of each term the definition of its substance must be present. (Met. VII. 1)
It is difficult to determine how or whether the conditions, potentiality, nature, and 
so on, are involved in essence and, when essence involves those conditions which 
are sources of movement, the essence can have a tendency to change in it. Among 
the conditions, the characteristics of nature is similar to those of essence. However, 
nature is not wholly identified with essence.
Martin44 does admit that the two notions have a different meaning. On the other 
hand, however, he seems to regard them as the same. "Another word for essence," 
he says, "is nature: this has a slightly different nuance, and signifies an essence in so 
far as it is the originating principle of actions". As discussed above, there is a 
radical difference between the two terms; essence does not seem to appear to have 
any power to move, whereas, according to Aristotle in the Physics II. 1, nature 
obviously has power. In an article in the "Oyster Club",45 Martin describes essence 
in terms of 'tendency' and says that "a tendency is a sort of power since something 
that has a tendency to become F can be F. ... A tendency to be F at least means a 
potentiality to be F". However, he does not give a sufficient account of the link 
between essence and tendency. Although it is true that a potentiality is closely 
related with its exercise, potentiality does not seem to be identified with the latter 
since between the potentiality of being actualised and the actualisation of it there
44 Marlin, op.cit., p. 70.
45 This is an annual departmental paper published by the Department of Philosophy, University of 
Glasgow, 1992.
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should be some power for the potentiality to be actual. Furthermore, when we 
discuss the characteristics of essence, the other conditions for change, such as 
potentiality and nature, are excluded. That is, at this stage we do not analyse the 
essence of a thing assuming that those conditions are given to the thing but separate 
it from them, as we separate form from matter in the discussion of form. In effect, 
we do not find any moving source from the essence in itself. In brief, for Martin to 
say that essence is some son of power he has to show what the power is. In any 
case essence and nature are not identified.
In consequence, from Aristotle's conception of 'for the sake of something' which 
coincides with the formal and the efficient it is clear that 'for the sake of something' 
is a thing's becoming what it is to be. And, to know what is it that a thing is to be 
is, according to Aristotle, to know the essence of it {Mel. 103lb l9-20). This 
suggests that, unless we know the essence of it, we are unable to understand what a 
thing changes for, or what the 'something' is. It is anyhow true that the completion 
o f a thing's essence designates its process towards being perfect, for essence is by 
definition what it is for a thing to be. We might now reach the conclusion that the 
essence .of natural beings is a necessary condition, though not sufficient, for a being 
to change. For a being to change it must have its essence which involves the other 
conditions, such as privation, potentiality, and nature. In other words, the change 
of a being is said to be "a fulfilment of its tendency"46 in so far as the being is under 
these conditions.
Given almost all the possible conditions for beings to change, we are now in the 
position to question whether Aristotle thinks that all natural beings have the same 
conditions for change and whether there are any other sources to determine their 
movements or tendencies.
46 Geach in Three Philosophers, p. 105.
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V.2 Natural Agency
Although the essence of a being is always present in the thing without reference to 
our observation it is undeniable that our ascribing the essence to a being is on the 
whole dependent on our observation. However, not all the appearances of a being 
will be all the essence of the being since some of them might be attributes; nor can 
all the essence of it be observable. Therefore, although Aristotle's conception of 
'for the sake of something' seems clear in that it designates the completion o f the 
what-it-is-to-be for a thing, what it is may still be obscure to us.
However, despite the fact that there still remains this sort of difficulty in knowing 
the essence of beings as such, since we are only humans and since we are not 
capable of seeing directly the inner structures of how beings are organised or what 
the real essence of beings are. we cannot but search for their essence from the 
phenomena which are possible for us to observe. To search for something obscure 
or something which we are not able to observe directly, as Aristotle suggests (Phy. 
184a6-184bl6), we must begin our examination by enquiring into something which 
is intelligible and familiar to us. In consequence, we cannot but admit that the 
phenomena of beings which occur always or for the most part, rather than, 
sometimes are a clue to their essence. Our position so far might be summed up by 
Geach's remarks;
To recognise the persistent identity of a thing, we must be able to pick out from the general flux of 
events the contribution made by that thing's operations; ...we have no intuitive insight as to which 
propositions of this kind hold good, but must proceed inductively.47
Thus, we cannot help our looking at the movement of natural beings other than 
humans as directed towards an end from an anthropomorphic vision in so far as we
47 Ibid.. p. 101.
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are humans. Therefore, it is to some extent understandable for Aristotle to explain 
natural processes in relation to human movements.
... as in human operations, so in natural processes: and as in processes, so in human operations 
(unless something interferes). Human operations are for an end, hence natural processes are so 
too. {Phy. 199a9-11)
This passage clearly shows that Aristotle's reasoning that natural processes are for 
an end is derived from his observing the fact that human actions are for an end.
Beings in nature might be first divided on the whole into animate and inanimate 
ones.48 And the former are again divided into moving (again into human beings and 
non-human animals) and non-moving beings (plants), and the latter into non- 
artificial beings, e.g. a stone, and artificial ones, e.g. a chair. However, as we shall 
see later on, Aristotle in the Physics II. 1 divides beings into natural beings and 
artificial ones. The main criterion of the division is whether they have within 
themselves tendencies to change. And those with a tendency towards change, 
change for the sake of something (194b33-195a2). As it may well be noted, what 
Aristotle means by an end of change is not that a change merely 'comes to an end', 
but that it is 'for an end'. Thus, to say that natural beings move towards an end 
gives an impression that non-human animals, plants, and, even, the simple bodies 
might have purposes as humans do.
However, considering that Aristotle obviously emphasises in the Physics 1.1 that 
to research into nature we must start from what is apparent to us it is quite doubtful 
whether Aristotle does claim that we should understand that movements o f natural 
beings in the same way as those of humans. For it is hard to assume that he does 
not notice the difference between, for example, animals and plants, or the simple 
bodies. If he does regard all the natural beings as acting in the same way without
48 Cf. A. Kenny, The Metaphysics o f  M ind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 34.
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further subdividing them into humans, non-human animals, plants, and so on, his 
division will be immediately faced such a question as how natural beings other than 
humans can also be able to perform a deliberate activity.
Aristotle writes in the Physics II. 1,
Among those formed by nature, we may name animals and their parts, plants, and the simple 
bodies (earth, fire. air. and water): all of these, together with beings like them, we call "formed by 
nature." Observation discloses how they differ from things not constituted by nature: each of them 
has within itself a beginning of movement and rest; whether the "movement" [or specific type of 
behaviour] is a local motion, growth or decline, or a qualitative change. (192b8-15)
This passage explicitly shows that Aristotle conceives of all natural beings as self- 
movers, able to move by themselves. If so, they do not require any sort of external 
conditions and the role of the external conditions might be "that of permitting the 
change or not hindering it".49 Unfortunately Aristotle here draws no distinction 
between the natural beings Therefore the passage does nothing to counter the 
impression that all the movements of natural beings, such as a stone's falling, an 
animal's jumping, a plant's rooting, and the like, can be understood in terms of 
intended activities.
To the question whether .Aristotle does not see the difference in respect of 
purposiveness between a human and a plant, an animal and a stone, or the like, 
Waterlow answers thus;
Aristotle himself would dismiss as fanciful the attribution of intention and deliberation to plants 
and animals; but is not the attribution of autonomous natures in the sense explained a similar 
mistake: one. moreover, that loses its rationale once we cease to regard all natural substances as 
purposeful agents? ... Aristotle saw as clearly as anyone that to interpret animal and plant
49 Waterlow, op.cit.. p. 29.
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behaviour as deliberate explains nothing that could not be well explained without it; whereas to 
deny natures and natural changes would for him be tantamount to denying the very possibility of 
all explanation.50
It is undeniable that for Aristotle the notion of nature is absolutely necessary. For 
nature is an originative source of change which allows the possibility of self-movers. 
However, it is doubtful whether Aristotle's conception of nature is equally applied 
to all natural beings. Waterlow's statements seem to imply that Aristotle's theory of 
nature is valid in so far as he looks at all natural beings with the same vision, 
namely, an anthropomorphic vision. Then, what is questionable here is whether 
Aristotle's theory of nature loses its grounds in case he classifies, or divides, natural 
beings into several groups, such as humans, non-human animals, plants, and the 
simple bodies. Thus, in this section we shall mainly enquire into two questions, 
whether Aristotle further subdivides natural beings and whether his division of them 
prevents him from claiming that all natural beings have within themselves a nature 
to move.
Before beginning our analysis of these points, let us first consider what Aristotle 
means by saying that even the movements of natural beings are also changed by 
something else which seems to run counter to the claim that they are self-movers.
Since some things, then, are both potential and actual, though not at the same time and in the 
same respect - but (for example) what is potentially hot is actually cold, therefore such things will 
act upon or be acted upon by one another in many wavs (for everything is capable both of acting 
and of being acted upon). Hence, too. every mover which is a physical agent is moved; indeed, 
every mover of this sort moves by being itself in movement. It seems to some that even mover is a 
moved mover. (Phy. 201a20-26)
50 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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In chapter III.2, we have considered in what sense the two types of potentialities, of 
acting and being acted on, are said to be in a being. On the whole, among two 
beings, one which has a potentiality of acting plays a role of an agent and the other 
which has a potentiality of being acted on of a patient. However, with this 
explanation Aristotle is unable to maintain the theory that there are self-movers. 
Therefore, he holds that there can be the two potentialities in a being. In an 
example of a doctor's healing himself, he has the potentiality of healing himself as a 
doctor as well as that of being healed as a patient. Thus, for Aristotle self-moving 
is still possible.
It is to be noted that this sort of potentiality is different from a mere possibility. 
That is to say, the potentially of acting should coincide with the potentiality of being 
acted on. And, the fact that the potentiality of acting always seeks for that of being 
acted on is now described as a natural tendency. Geach expounds this as follows;
We must be careful not to regard natural tendencies as mere potentialities. For. first, there are 
often potentialities in a situation in which, given the agents actually present, there is no
corresponding tendency  Again, if tendencies are to be regarded as mere potentialities, then
what actually happens will be the resultant of a lot of things that would happen if only there were
not other things that would happen if... and at that rate nothing would ever actually happen.........
A tendency for something to happen is different from its actually happening: but yet a tendency is 
somehow actual, not a mere potentiality, a 'would happen if .51
To begin with, let us examine Aristotle's division o f beings in nature in the Physics. 
Aristotle divides beings into those which have life and those which are lifeless. It is
51 Geach. op.cit., p. 104. Geach's usage of the term 'potentiality' here seems to designate a mere 
'possibility' in the ordinary sense rather than potentiality in Aristotle's terminology; whereas the 
meaning of ’tendency' fits for Aristotelian potentiality. That is, Aristotelian potentiality is not a 
mere possibility, but something that will be aclualised in so far as it meets a proper opposite 
potentiality and in so far as it is not hindered.
to be recalled that for Aristotle nature is not only of a source of movement, but also 
of rest (Phy. 192b 13). Aristotle holds that natural beings are sometimes in 
movement and sometimes at rest (254a 17-18) and divides them into two groups; 
(1) that admit of both movements and rest, and (2) that are always subject to 
movement (254b7-10). And, the beings grouped in (2) are moved 'naturally' or 
'violently' by something else; that is, fire's moving upward and a stone's falling 
downward are natural movements, whereas fire's being moved downward and a 
stone's being moved upward are violent movements.
Surely, they cannot set themselves in motion, any more than they can bring themselves to a stop, 
as animals can. ... It would, moreover, be unreasonable to suppose that, if [elements] moved of 
their own accord, they would be capable of only a single kind of self-initiated "movement". ... 
nothing naturally unitary [like fire, and so forth] can be self-moving, any more than can anything 
else that is continuous: ... nonliving things are [even in their natural movements] moved by 
something. ... Fire and earth, then, are forcibly moved by some agent in ways at variance with 
their nature: they are moved naturally when they are impelled to pass from their respective 
potential states to their corresponding activities. {Phy. 255a7-32)
At this point, what is worth questioning is in what sense, then, all natural beings 
have in themselves a nature to move0 That means that they are capable of 
actualising, or of changing, when their potentialities of being acted on meet the 
appropriate potentialities of acting, and the reverse. Aristotle says,
Thus, a lever moves a weight by main force, whereas a body which is actually hot can act in 
accordance with this very nature upon a body which is potentially hot; and so forth. Just so. a 
body can be acted upon in accordance with its nature if it is potentially of a certain sort or so much 
or somewhere... (255a23-26)
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Aristotle's expression that "natural beings have within themselves a tendency to 
change" means that they are capable of changing in accordance with their 
potentialities given to them from their essence. In other words, all the natural 
beings have a tendency to move 'according to nature' in the ordinary sense, not 
'contrary to nature'.
Apart from the classifications of natural beings discussed so far into living and 
non-living beings, Aristotle in the De Anima divides living beings, such as plants, 
non-human animals, and humans, in accordance with their soul. Soul might be 
characterised as three types; (i) the nutritive and reproductive soul, (ii) the sentient 
soul, and (iii) the rational soul.52 The nutritive soul is in all living beings to preserve 
their existence and, when living things have become what they are to be, the most 
natural act is to reproduce their new generation as themselves (De An. 415a22-b2). 
On the other hand, the sentient soul is only in animate beings, animals and humans, 
and it is a cause of an animal's movement, sight, hearing, taste, touch, and so on are 
involved in the soul. Since plants and inanimate animals are unable to move they 
look for nutrition to preserve their life from the soil to which they belong. On the 
other hand, since animals are not able to take nutrition from the soil but are able to 
move they move around to look for food. However, it is no use for an animal to 
move about unless it can recognise its food when it finds it.53 Finally, there is one 
more sort of soul which is possessed only by humans, that is, the rational soul. 
According to Aristotle, appetite and mind are derived from thought which is a 
faculty of the rational soul. As regards the role of the soul, he explains as follows;
The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause and source have mam senses. 
But the soul is the cause of its bod} alike in all three senses which we explicitly recognize. It is (a) 
the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end. it is (c) the essence of the whole living body. ... 
in everything the essence is identical with the ground of its being, and here, in the case of living
I 52 G.R.G. Mure, Aristotle (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 97.
| 53 Ross, op.cit., p. 130.
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things, their being is to live, and of their being and their living the soul in them is the cause or 
source. Further, the actuality of whatever is potential is identical with its fomiulable essence (De 
An. 415b8*14)
As shown, the soul is also a source of movement and seems to be involved in the 
essence o f living beings rather than another source apart from it. In other words, 
the essence of living beings is to live and the source of living is now defined as the 
soul in the beings.
Although we have not discussed at large the property of and the connection 
between the faculties of each soul it has been clearly confirmed from Aristotle's 
division of souls which depend on the essence of living beings that he does not 
regard all the movements of the beings other than humans as the same as humans 
who are purposeful agents.
In effect, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle explicitly states that only the actions 
done by humans from their anger or appetite are called voluntary'.
... Presumably acts done by reason of anger or appetite are not rightly called involuntary. For in 
the first place, on that showing none of the other animals will act voluntarily, nor will children: 
and secondly, is it meant that we do not do voluntarily any of the acts that are due to appetite or 
anger, or that we do the noble acts voluntarily and the base acts involuntarily? Is not this absurd, 
when one and the same thing is the cause?... and therefore also the actions which proceed from 
anger or appetite are the man's actions. (K.E. 111 la2 l-b3)
It is to be noted that, although Aristotle ascribes voluntary actions to humans, he 
excludes children from the humans who are capable of acting voluntarily. He 
relates the voluntary’ action with choice and thinks that children are not capable of 
making a proper choice (N.E. 111 lb4-9) since choice involves a rational principle 
and thought (1112a 16-17).
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Ross54 interprets Aristotelian voluntary actions as follows; "action is voluntary, 
then, when (I) its origin is in the agent, and (2) he knows the circumstances in 
which the act is done." However, if one thinks that the two conditions are sufficient 
for Aristotelian voluntary' actions it is misleading. For, it is undeniable that the 
origin of actions done by non-human animals and children is in them and that they 
might sometimes, though not always, understand why they act in the way they do. 
Does, then, Aristotle call their actions voluntary? In effect, Aristotle's remarks on 
this point are confusing since to some extent he seems to call the actions o f animals 
voluntary7.
Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary: the latter extends 
more w idely. For both children and the lower animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice, 
and acts done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary , but not as chosen. (A £ 
111lb7-9)
At this point, then, we have to divide voluntary actions into two types, those from 
anger and appetite and those related to choice which involves a rational principle 
and thought.
Those who say it is appetite or anger or wish or a kind of opinion do not seem to be right. For 
choice is not common to irrational creatures as w'ell. but appetite and anger are. Again, the 
incontinent man acts with appetite, but not with choice: while the continent man on the contrary 
acts with choice, but not with appetite. Again, appetite is contrary to choice, but not appetite to 
appetite. Again, appetite relates to the pleasant and the painful, choice neither to the painful nor 
to the pleasant. Still less is it anger: for acts due to anger are thought to be less than any others of
choice  What, then, or w'hat kind of thing is it. since it is none of the things we have
mentioned? It seems to be voluntary. but not all that is voluntary to be an object of choice. Is it.
54 Ibid., p. 198.
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then, what has been decided on by previous deliberation'’ At any rate choice involves a rational 
principle and thought... (A'.£. 111 lblO -1112a 17)
As discussed so far, Aristotle does not have any doubt that plants, non-human 
animals, and humans are living beings and that among them there are animate 
beings, namely, self-movers, and inanimate beings. And animate beings can have 
voluntary actions in the sense that they are self-movers. However, deliberate, or 
intended, actions related to reason, or thought, can be ascribed only to humans 
other than children. Clark's quotations might make this point clear:
Proairesis is deliberative desire (N.E. 1139a23). Man is the only one of the animals that 
deliberates (Hist. An. 488b24). Neither children nor beasts (alike in many ways: Hist. An. 
588a33f.) can 'act', only one who has reflected (E.E. 1224a28). They lack Proairesis because they 
lack the ability to deliberate and 'the concept of''why'” (E.E. 1226b23f.).55
Consequently, there seems to be no difficulty for Aristotle in applying the notion of 
nature to all natural beings. The common nature of all the beings is that they have 
the potentiality o f being acted on. And therefore, when they are caused by the 
appropriate potentiality of acting they are able to be changed. And, this son of 
nature is possessed by the simple bodies, too. Allan sketches Aristotle's use of the 
word 'nature' thus.
It may mean (1) the original state of a thing, as opposed to its state when modified by culture and 
education, and hence those tendencies in anv growing thing which are first displayed, as opposed 
to others not less natural which come out at a later stage: and (2) the acme of development, which 
is reached when even inherent capacity has been brought out... Nature may also mean (3) the
55 S.R.L. Clark, Aristotle' Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1975), p.22. At the beginning of the 
book, Clark shows his doubt whether Hist. An. (Historia Animalium) is Aristotle's original work.
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power of spontaneous movement and change, as opposed to movement which is induced from 
without, or by force, and (4) the total aggregate of bodies which display such movement.56
In the passage, Allan seems to think that being moved by force is not a meaning of 
nature in Aristotle. However, as we have so far seen, Aristotle divides movements 
into two types, natural movements and violent movements (Phy. VIII.4). In effect, 
for Aristotle what is moved is moved by something else or by something qua itself. 
Therefore, in a strict sense for him it seems that nothing moves spontaneously. 
However, o f the things which are moved essentially "some are moved by 
themselves, whereas others are moved by something else; and some are moved 
naturally, whereas others are moved 'contrary to nature' or violently (Phy. 254b14- 
17)". What is moved naturally may be also moved violently. As for the simple 
bodies, for example, a stone's falling downward and fire's moving upward are said 
to be moved naturally, whereas a stone's falling downward and fire's moving 
downward are the examples of being moved violently. Those which are moved by 
themselves qua themselves can be called self-movers.
On the other hand, as for all living beings, the nature that they have in common is 
self-maintenance and reproduction derived from their soul, and, again, from their 
essence. In addition to these characteristics of nature, non-human animals as well 
as humans have sensation. However, non-human animals do not have thought. It is 
a peculiar property of nature which humans only possess.
In brief, when among natural beings those which always have to be moved by 
something else are so moved the movement is a natural movement for them. And 
such a movement is from their nature. And also, when those which are capable of 
being moved by themselves qua themselves are so moved their movements are said 
to be self-movements and those movements are according to their nature. Thus, by 
showing the common nature of all natural beings and the hierarchy o f the soul in
56 D.J. Allan, The Philosophy o f  Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1970). p. 24.
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living beings Aristotle is able to maintain his theory of self-movers, as opposed to 
Waterlow's understanding that Aristotle loses his grounds for the theory of nature 
once we cease to regard all natural substances as purposeful agents. With regard to 
the argument so far, Wieland's statement is worth reading: "Aristotle's speaking of 
the way in which the natural world is ordered for man's benefit should not be, 
therefore, interpreted as implying a universal teleology".57
57 W. Wieland, The Problem of Teleology', in J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji (cds.) 
Articles on Aristotle Vol. 1 (London: Duckworth. 1975), P. 153 & p. 158.
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Conclusion
For Aristotle who pertinently emphasises the fact that change is observable, there 
should be a subject that persists through all change. Otherwise, we would not be 
able to observe, or notice, that there is any change. For this reason, Aristotle 
ascribes the Presocratics' claim that nothing can come from what is or from what is 
not to their misunderstanding of the two terms, what is and what is not. That is to 
say, he thinks that it is not the case that what is comes from what is absolutely or 
from what is not absolutely, but that there must be an underlying subject which has 
a privation in change.
Change is from something to something else or to something different and that 
very 'something' is that which persists through the change, change occurs between a 
pair of contraries, between something and something else, e.g. between heat and 
cold. And such change is only possible to material substances that are composed of 
form and matter; change is not from 'heat-ness' to 'cold-ness' but from 'something' 
hot to 'something' cold. However, if the substances designate those which are 
perfect or which are already formed what they are to be, there might be no 
possibility that they require any change. For this reason, Aristotle supposes that 
they should be in a state of lacking, or privation. Consequently, he considers 
change as filling in the state of privation; that is, something which is not hot 
(something which is in a state of lacking being hot) can become hot. Thus, by 
adopting the notion of privation he can claim that substances are capable of 
changing.
With regard to the notion, Aristotle goes further to claim that change is not from 
'anything' to 'anything' but from 'something' to 'something'. Thus there appears the 
notion o f potentialities of acting and being acted on. For example, it is not the case 
that anybody is capable of healing a patient but that somebody who is capable of
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healing can heal a patient, that is, in so far as the 'somebody' is a doctor who is 
capable of healing. Similarly, not anybody can be healed but somebody can be 
healed in so far as the 'somebody' is capable of being healed.
However, there still remains the problem of how, then, the 'somebodies' are 
capable of acting and of being acted on. Aristotle answers that it is because they 
have in themselves a source of movement and rest. Since he maintains that 
whatever moves is moved by something else or by itself, what is common to all 
natural beings, the simple bodies, plants, and animals, is the nature of being moved. 
Furthermore, as we have seen in analysing the notion of nature, Aristotle thinks that 
nature is differently applied to living beings in accordance with their soul; that is, 
Aristotle ascribes some other characteristics to the nature of living beings. The 
nature of maintaining their existence and reproducing is the common characteristics 
of plants and animals including humans. However, the nature of will or desire in 
relation to 'choice' is only common to humans other than children. Thus, for one to 
attribute the notion of nature to all natural beings the nature of being moved is the 
better candidate among the hierarchy of natures.
Apart from the source of change, nature, we have examined whether the four 
types o f aitia are other sources of change and concluded that they are rather 
explanatory factors than real sources which effect change and that, although they 
are related to change, they are the secondary sources which are next to nature. 
Thus, nature is the primary and immediate source which is closely related to beings' 
movements.
The next question we have endeavoured to answer is where, then, the nature of 
beings comes from. Aristotle conceives of natural beings' nature as coming from 
their essence (Met. 1014b20-21). Therefore, we have attempted to examine what 
essence is with reference to Aristotle's conception of 'for the sake of something'. 
Essence is said to be what it is for a thing to be or, according to Geach, a fulfilment 
of tendency.
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Then, it is clear that for change to be possible the essence of beings include all the 
preconditions, and sources, for change. In other words, for the change of natural 
beings to be possible they must be composed of form and matter, be in a state of 
privation, have in themselves a nature to change, and so on. And therefore it might 
be true to say that the total sum of the conditions of beings stated above can be 
identified with the conception of essence. That is to say, if essence does not satisfy 
any of the conditions it cannot be referred to as essence.
Although Aristotle conceives that essence is that which is always present in natural 
beings, and not that which can be attained, he fails to give us an answer to the 
question of how this essence is to be present in the beings. It is not sufficient for 
anyone to answer that the essence of beings is that which is 'essentially' or 'naturally' 
in them. A prerequisite for Aristotle's theory of change to be complete is to find an 
answer to the question, such as what is the origin of essence, what are the grounds 
for saying that there is essence in natural beings, or what are the preconditions for 
essence to be present in natural beings. Therefore, to enquire into such a question 
is that which Aristotle leaves us to pursue.
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